Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-dfsvx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T12:08:17.572Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Problems of Interaction Between the International and Domestic Legal Orders

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 September 2014

Hisashi OWADA
Hisashi OWADA*
Affiliation:
International Court of Justice, The Haguemail@icj-cij.org
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

With the rapid advent of globalization, international law has come to expand into new areas which had traditionally been under the exclusive domain of municipal law. As a result, problems concerning interaction between the international and domestic legal orders have become increasingly common. Specifically, difficulties have arisen concerning the implementation of international law decisions into the domestic legal order. This paper examines this problem in three different areas: the process of incorporation of international treaties into the domestic legal order; the issue of giving effect to Security Council resolutions in domestic law; and the issue of the implementation within the domestic legal system of judgments of international courts and tribunals. The paper concludes that, in an age of the emergence of a global community as a matter of socioeconomic reality, the two legal orders should work together to promote common public policy, paying due respect to the decisions of international institutions.

Type
Invited Articles
Information
Asian Journal of International Law , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , July 2015 , pp. 246 - 278
Copyright
Copyright © Asian Journal of International Law 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Judge and former President, International Court of Justice. This paper is based on the original address that the author gave at the Singapore Academy of Law in 2010, that has since been revised and brought up to date. The views expressed in this paper are the personal views of the writer and do not reflect in any way the position of any institution that the author belongs to or is associated with.

References

1. Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 31 October 1951 (entered into force 15 July 1955), art. 1.

2. Council Decision 2006/719/EC on the Accession of the Community to the Hague Conference on Private International Law OJ L297 (2006).

3. See e.g. HUDSON, Manley O., International Legislation: A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest Beginning with the Covenant of the League of Nations (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1931–1950)Google Scholar.

4. See, however, on the parallel development of “private regulation” on the global level, e.g. BÜTHE, Tim and MATTLI, Walter, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. WILDE, Ralph, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; KNOLL, Bernhard, The Legal Status of Territories Subject to Administration by International Organizations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, [2010] I.C.J. Rep. 403.

7. Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is in Accordance With International Law, 8 October 2008, GA Res 63/3, 63 GAOR Supp. (No. 49) 10.

8. Regulation on a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, UN Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (2001).

9. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, [2010] I.C.J. Rep. 403 at 439−40, para. 88.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., at 440, para. 89.

12. Compare this to the famous Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), seen as an early example of the recognition that individuals could bear international rights (see e.g. PARLETT, Kate, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 347). The PCIJ interpreted the Beamtenabkommen in the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig Advisory Opinion, and concluded that:

In the intention of the contracting Parties, the relations between the Polish Railways Administration and the Danzig officials should be governed by the Beamtenabkommen, the provisions of which constitute part of what the High Commissioner calls the “contract of service”, and that, consequently, the Danzig officials have, in accordance with the first part of the Decision, a right of action against the Polish Railways Administration for the recovery of pecuniary claims based on the Beamtenabkommen.

See Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion [1928] P.C.I.J. Rep. 15, Series B, para. 47.

13. Difficulties in the implementation of Acts of international organizations in general are discussed in REINISCH, August, ed., Challenging Acts of International Organizations Before National Courts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14. O'CONNELL, Daniel Patrick, International Law, Vol. I (London: Stevens and Sons, 1970)Google Scholar at 38.

15. See TRIEPEL, Heinrich, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Leipzig: C.L. Hirschfeld, 1899)Google Scholar 15; Dionisio ANZILOTTI, Cours de Droit International (1929 French translation from the Italian by Gilbert Gidel, this edition published in 1999) at 43−4.

16. Ibid.

17. LAUTERPACHT, Hersch, ed., International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I, 8th edn. (by L. Oppenheim) (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955)Google Scholar at 38.

18. See on the “Monistic Doctrine”, ibid., at 38−9. Kelsen's monism is related to his general theory of law and state. Thus, Kelsen explains that:

The subjects of international law are—like the subjects of national law—individual human beings. States as juristic persons are subjects of international law in the same way as corporations as juristic persons are subjects of national law. The statement that states as juristic persons are subjects of international law does not mean that individuals are not the subjects of the obligations, responsibilities, and rights established by that law. It only means that individual human beings are indirectly and collectively, in their capacity as organs or members of the state, subjects of the obligations, responsibilities, and rights presented as obligations, responsibilities, and rights of the state. Besides, human beings are also directly and individually subjects of obligations, responsibilities, and rights established by international law.

See KELSEN, Hans, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1952) at 114−115Google Scholar.

19. E.g. WENZEL, Max, Juristische Grundbegriffe (Berlin: F. Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1920)Google Scholar at 387.

20. BLACKSTONE, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1769)Google Scholar at 67.

21. BRADLEY, Curtis, International Law in the U.S. Legal System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 142.

22. See art. 28 of the Greek Constitution, which reads as follows:

1. The generally recognised rules of international law, as well as international conventions as of the time they are ratified by statute and become operative according to their respective conditions, shall be an integral part of domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law. The rules of international law and of international conventions shall be applicable to aliens only under the condition of reciprocity.

(Hellenic Parliament, ed., The Constitution of Greece: As Revised by the Parliamentary Resolution of May 27th 2008 of the VIIIth Revisionary Parliament (2008) at 45); see also art. 10 of the Italian Constitution, which reads as follows: “The Italian legal system conforms to the generally recognised principles of international law.” (Senato della Repubblica, ed., Constitution of the Italian Republic (2007) at 6); and art. 9(1) of the Austrian Federal Constitution, which reads as follows: “The generally recognized rules of international law are regarded as integral parts of Federal law.” (Bundespressedienst, ed., Austrian Federal Constitutional Laws (selection) (2000) at 10).

23. E.g. the French and Dutch Constitutions contain no explicit rules on the domestic applicability of customary international law (see Conseil Constitutionnel, ed., Constitution of 4 October 1958 (web version, as amended on 23 July 2008), and Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Constitutional Affairs and Legislation Division, ed., The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (2008)).

24. See art. VI(2) of the US Constitution. On the later-in-time rule, see Whitney et al. v. Robertson (9 January 1888) 8 S.Ct. 456 at 458.

25. DUBINSKY, Paul R., “United States” in Dinah SHELTON. ed., International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)Google Scholar, at 638.

26. In relation to France, see art. 55 of the French Constitution; in relation to Germany, see arts. 25 and 59 of the German Federal Constitution; in relation to the Netherlands, see arts. 93, 94, and 120 of the Dutch Constitution; in relation to Poland, see art. 91 of the Polish Constitution; in relation to Jordan, the Constitution of Jordan does not explicitly address the question of hierarchy, but the country's constitutional jurisprudence has recognized that customary international law and self-executing treaties have superior status to domestic legislation; in relation to Namibia, see art. 144 of the Constitution of Namibia; in relation to Belgium, the country's constitutional jurisprudence indicates that self-executing treaties have priority over any incompatible domestic legislation. See generally Shelton, ibid., and GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, Vera, ed., National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A Comparative Study (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004)Google Scholar.

27. See e.g. Maclaine Watson v. Department of Trade and Industry, 81 ILR 670 at 684.

28. Thus, the Constitution of Japan does not explicitly specify a hierarchy, except that art. 98 of the Constitution provides as follows: “This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed.” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, ed., The Constitution of Japan). This provision has been interpreted in doctrine and practice as the recognition that treaties and customary international law are superior to statutes. The Constitution of Uganda is also silent on the specific hierarchy of international law in the domestic legal order.

29. See generally Gerald FITZMAURICE, “The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law” 92 Recueil des Cours (The Hague Academy of International Law, 1957, II) at 68−94; Charles ROUSSEAU, “Principes de droit international public”, 93 Recueil des Cours (Hague Academy of International Law, 1958, I) at 465−74.

30. Fitzmaurice, , ibid., at 72Google Scholar.

31. Ibid., at 69.

32. “Il n'existe pas davantage de règle générale suivant laquelle une norme internationale abrogerait automatiquement une norme interne qui lui serait contraire” (Rousseau, supra note 29 at 473).

33. O'Connell, , supra note 14 at 44Google Scholar.

34. See generally Bruno SIMMA, “From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law” 250 Recueil des Cours (Hague Academy of International Law, 1994) at 217.

35. Vera GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, “Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in Domestic Law”, in Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 26 at 37.

36. ANZILOTTI, Dionisio, Il Diritto Internazionale nei Giudizi Interni (Bologna: Ditta Nicola Zanichelli, 1905)Google Scholar at 177

37. See e.g. Parlett, , supra note 12Google Scholar; PAUST, Jordan J., “Non-State Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion” (2011) 51 Virginia Journal of International Law 977Google Scholar; ORAKHELASHVILI, Alexander, “The Position of the Individual in International Law” (2001) 31 California Western International Law Journal 241Google Scholar; PORTMANN, Roland, Legal Personality in International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially 126−72.

38. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), GAOR 3rd Session Part I 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948).

39. See e.g. BUERGENTHAL, Thomas, “The Evolving International Human Rights System” (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 783–807Google Scholar.

40. See generally SCHABAS, William, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, [2005] I.C.J. Rep. 168.

42. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 12.

43. This view was not accepted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Medellín v. Texas (25 March 2008) 552 US 491.

44. Nada v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 10593/08, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber [2012] 56 EHRR 18.

45. Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 5809/08, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber (Second Section), (26 November 2013).

46. As Krisch notes, “On the basis of [Article 41 of the UN Charter] the Council has broadened the scope of its action well beyond the initially envisioned, circumscribed responses to particular crises, and it has turned into a legislator, regulator, administrator as well as a jury on a broad range of issues related to peace and security.” (KRISCH, Nico, “Article 41” in Bruno SIMMA et al., eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn., 2012)Google Scholar, at 1309.

47. See on the issue of “democratic deficit” with respect to the Security Council, TZANAKOPOULOS, Antonios, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures Against Wrongful Sanctions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 12.

48. See Krisch, , supra note 46 at 1312−1319Google Scholar.

49. Ibid., at 1324−9.

50. This question is addressed by Tzanakopoulos, supra note 47.

51. In this context, the database on national implementation measures of UN sanctions and respect for human rights of the Council of Europe's Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law contains relevant information ranging from 2006 to 2011 from a number of mostly European countries. See CAHDI, “Database on National Implementation Measures of UN Sanctions and Respect for Human Rights” (30 August 2011) Council of Europe Doc. CAHDI (2011) Inf 10.

52. As Dinah Shelton notes, there is variation in the terminology used across countries when “deciding whether or not to enforce a treaty provision invoked by one of the parties to a pending case. The courts of several countries, including the United States and Japan, refer to the doctrine of ‘self-executing’ treaties, while European courts tend to discuss ‘direct applicability’ or ‘direct effect’. In all these instances, however, the courts are similarly examining the question of whether the treaty provision in question is capable of judicial enforcement or whether an intervening legislative or executive act is required.” (Dinah SHELTON, “Introduction” in Shelton, supra note 25 at 11).

53. Gowlland-Debbas, , supra note 35 at 39−40Google Scholar.

54. Erika De Wet, “South Africa”, in Shelton, supra note 25 at 576.

55. Gowlland-Debbas, , supra note 35 at 40−41Google Scholar.

56. Ibid., at 52.

57. Ibid., at 56.

58. The following discussion is adapted and taken from Hisashi OWADA, “Japan” in Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 26 at 286−7

59. Ibid., at 287.

60. Jochen Abraham FROWEIN and Nico KRISCH, “Germany” in Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 26 at 257.

61. Ibid.

62. Mathias-Charles KRAFFT et al., “Switzerland” in Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 26 at 570.

63. Ibid., at 568.

64. Ibid.

65. As Shelton notes:

Three main issues concerning international law arise in federal systems. The first is the extent to which, if at all, foreign affairs matters, including the conclusion of treaties, are reserved exclusively for the national government. The second issue is (p. 21) the place of international law in the law of the component parts of the federal system, including the problem of “federalizing” local matters through exercise of the treaty-making power. Finally, debate has arisen over the extent to which local authorities may regulate local matters through adoption of international law.

Shelton, , supra note 25 at 20−21Google Scholar.

66. Ekmekdjian, Miguel Angel c/ Sofovich, Gerardo y otros (7 July 1992) Fallos 315:1492 (discussed in Emilio J. CÁRDENAS and Mariano GARCIA-RUBIO, “Argentina” in Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 26 at 94).

67. Cárdenas, and Garcia-Rubio, , ibid., at 95−97Google Scholar.

68. Ibid., at 97−8.

69. LOWENFELD, Andreas F., “United States” in Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 26 at 621Google Scholar.

70. Byrd Amendment, reproduced in Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 26 at 621.

71. Lowenfeld, , supra note 69 at 621Google Scholar.

72. Question of Southern Rhodesia, GA Res. 2946 (XXVII), 7 December 1972.

73. Security Council Resolution 314, 28 February 1972, UN Doc. S/RES/314; Security Council Resolution 318, 28 July 1972, UN Doc. S/RES/318; Security Council Resolution 320, 29 September 1972, UN Doc. S/RES/320.

74. Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

75. Security Council Resolution 301, 20 October 1971, UN Doc. S/RES/301 (1971).

76. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (1976).

77. Ibid., at 849.

78. Ibid., at 850.

79. Ibid., at 851.

80. Ibid.

81. Security Council Resolution 1390, 16 January 2002, UN Doc. S/RES/1390; Security Council Resolution 1333, 19 December 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1333; Security Council Resolution 1267, 15 October 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1267.

82. See the List established and maintained by the Sanctions Committee pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) with respect to individuals, groups, undertakings, and other entities associated with al-Qa'ida, online: The Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml>.

83. Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber [2008] ECR I-06351, at paras. 46 and 49.

84. Ibid., para. 153.

85. Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Case T-315/01, European Court of Justice, Court of First Instance [2005] ECR II-03649, at para. 183.

86. Ibid., at para. 184.

87. Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council, Grand Chamber, supra note 83.

88. Ibid., para. 326.

89. Ibid., para. 285.

90. Ibid., para. 316.

91. Ibid., paras. 370−1.

92. Ibid., para. 290.

93. Ibid., para. 298.

94. European Commission, Council of the European Union, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland vs. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C 595/10 P, European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, 18 July 2013.

95. Ibid., para. 37

96. Ibid., paras. 44−5.

97. Ibid., paras. 130−2.

98. Ibid.

99. Nada v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 10593/08, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber [2012] ECHR 1691.

100. Ibid., paras. 196−7.

101. Ibid., para. 213.

102. Al-Dulimi, supra note 45

103. The sanctions were imposed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1483, 22 May 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1483.

104. The Court in Al-Dulimi compared the underlying sanctions regimes in the case and in Nada as follows:

The Court takes the view that the present case should be examined in the light of the equivalent protection criterion, particularly on account of the fact that the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially paragraph 23 of Resolution 1483 (2003), do not confer on the States concerned any discretion in the implementation of the obligations arising thereunder. This essentially distinguishes the situation in the present case from that of the Nada case, where the Grand Chamber found that Switzerland had a certain latitude in implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions (see Nada, cited above, §§ 175−180).

Al-Dulimi, supra note 45, para. 117. English translation, online: <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int>. The quote in French, the original language of the judgment, is as follows:

La Cour estime que la présente affaire se prête à un examen à la lumière du critère de la protection équivalente, en particulier du fait que les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité, notamment le paragraphe 23 de la Résolution 1483 (2003), ne confèrent aux Etats visés aucun pouvoir discrétionnaire dans la mise en oeuvre des obligations en découlant. A cet égard, la situation de l'espèce se distingue essentiellement de celle de l'affaire Nada, précitée, dans laquelle la Grande Chambre a conclu que la Suisse jouissait d'une certaine latitude dans la mise en oeuvre des résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité (Nada, précité, §§ 175−180).

105. Ibid., paras. 118−21.

106. Ibid., para. 134. English translation, online: <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int>. The quote in French, the original language of the judgment, is as follows:

La Cour estime que tant qu'il n'existe pas d'examen judiciaire efficace et indépendant, au niveau des Nations unies, de la légitimité de l'inscription des personnes et entités sur leurs listes, il est essentiel que ces personnes et entités soient autorisées à demander l'examen par les tribunaux nationaux de toute mesure prise en application du régime des sanctions. Or, les requérants n'ont pas bénéficié d'un tel contrôle. Il s'ensuit que leur droit d'accès à un tribunal a été atteint dans sa substance même.

107. Thus, Verdirame highlights the effect of domestic lawsuits on the procedural reforms of the sanctions regime at the UN level as follows:

Despite the inevitable differences between various courts, it was clear by the late 2000s that the Security Council and its sanctions committees were not going to be given a carte blanche from courts in a number of jurisdictions. The pressure of domestic and human rights litigation has prompted some procedural reforms.

VERDIRAME, Guglielmo, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 319.

108. See further Schabas, supra note 40; SANDHOLTZ, Wayne, “Creating Authority by the Council: The International Criminal Tribunals” in Bruce CRONIN and Ian HURD, eds., The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2008)Google Scholar, at 131.

109. Security Council Resolution 827, 25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/827, para. 4 [ICTY Statute].

110. Ibid., art. 29(1).

111. Ibid., art. 29(2).

112. Ibid., arts. 18(2) and 29; Security Council Resolution 955, 8 November 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955, arts. 17(2) and 29 [ICTR Statute].

113. ICTY Statute, supra note 109, art. 24(3); ICTR Statute, ibid., Annex, art. 23(3).

114. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Practice Relating to Rule 161: International Cooperation in Criminal Proceedings”, online: Customary International Humanitarian Database <http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter44_rule161>.

115. Arrêté fédéral relative à la coopération avec les tribunaux internationaux charges de poursuivre les violations graves du droit international humanitaire, 21 Décembre 1995, RS 351.20.

116. Krafft, et al., supra note 62 at 565Google Scholar.

117. Ibid., at 565.

118. Ibid. Similarly, art. 7 of the law on international judicial assistance in criminal matters prohibits the extradition of Swiss nationals to foreign authorities.

119. Ibid., at 566.

120. Frowein, and Krisch, , supra note 60 at 258Google Scholar.

121. Ibid., at 259.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid., at 260.

124. See e.g. Hans-Georg MAAßEN, “Artikel 16” in Volker EPPING and Christian HILLGRUBER, eds., Beck'scher Online-Kommentar Grundgesetz, 18th edn. (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2013), paras. 50−8.

125. The Netherlands has passed similar implementing legislation to Switzerland and Germany. See Alfred H.A. SOONS, “Netherlands” in Gowlland-Debbas, supra note 26 at 368−9.

126. For this judicial wandering, see typically the case before the Supreme Court of the United States of Medellín v. Texas (25 March 2008) 552 US 491.

127. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 12, at 71, para. 153(4).

128. Ibid., at 72, para. 153(9).

129. Medellín v. Texas (25 March 2008) 552 US 491.

130. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Mexico v. United States of America), [2009] I.C.J. Rep. 3, at 10−11, para. 24.

131. See e.g. “Letter from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Attorney General Michael Mukasey to Rick Perry, Governor of the State of Texas”, 17 June 2008. Supreme Court of the United States, Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas or for Extraordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus, pp. 80a–81a, online: <http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/Medellin_Appendix.pdf>.

132. CarrieLyn D. GUYMON, ed., Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2012, Office of the Legal Adviser of the US Department of State, at 17.

133. See e.g. CHARNOVITZ, Steve, “Correcting America's Continuing Failure to Comply with the Avena Judgment” (2012) 106 American Journal of International Law 572CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 578 (noting that “Congress has many options for bringing the United States into compliance with the VCCR”).

134. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. cir 1988).

135. Ibid., 934.

136. Ibid., 938.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. SCHULTE, Constanze, Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 271−273CrossRefGoogle Scholar:

Only on a few occasions have states openly and wilfully chosen to disregard the Court's judgments: in the Corfu Channel, Fisheries jurisdiction, Tehran hostages, and Nicaragua cases. Even in these cases, the effects of non-compliance were mitigated to a certain extent, given eventual or partial compliance by the losing party, or changes in the law, or political scene that diminished the relevance of the original decision … In some cases, fears of non-compliance proved unfounded in spite of substantial grounds for concern because of important interest involved or past military clashes. Thailand followed through with its obligations under the judgment in Temple of Preah Vihear, despite its initial reaction to the decision. In the Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) case, Libya withdrew its troops from the area in question despite fears that it might refuse to do so. These cases point positively to the respect of parties for the Court's role in the settlement of disputes, as it demonstrates that states will comply even with judgments contrary to their national interests.

See also on this issue, with similar conclusions but varying methodological approaches, SHANY, Yuval, “Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach” (2012) 106 American Journal of International Law 225CrossRefGoogle Scholar; PULKOWSKI, Dirk, “Testing Compliance Theories: Towards US Obedience of International Law in the Avena Case” (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 511CrossRefGoogle Scholar; LLAMZON, Aloysius P., “Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice” (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 815CrossRefGoogle Scholar; HUNEEUS, Alexandra V., “Compliance with International Court Judgments and Decisions” in Cesare ROMANO et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 437–463Google Scholar; JONES, Heather L., “Why Comply? An Analysis of Trends in Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice since Nicaragua” (2011) 12 Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law 57Google Scholar; THIRLWAY, Hugh, “The International Court of Justice 1989−2009: At the Heart of the Dispute Settlement System?” (2010) 57 Netherlands International Law Review 351CrossRefGoogle Scholar (noting that “the record as regards contentious cases is good; there have been hardly any cases in which compliance with a judgment was repudiated”).

140. BÚRCA, Gráinne DE, “The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi” (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 1 at 49Google Scholar.