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United we stand, divided we fall: Cognition, emotion, and the moral link between them

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 June 2015

Andrea Manfrinati*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milano, Italy. andrea.manfrinati@unimib.ithttp://www.unimib.it/

Abstract

Contrary to Greene's dual-process theory of moral judgment (Greene 2013), this commentary suggests that the network view of the brain proposed by Pessoa, in which emotion and cognition may be used as labels in the context of certain behaviors, but will not map clearly into compartmentalized pieces of the brain, could represent a better explanation of the rationale behind people's moral behavior.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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