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A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY-BASED SALIENCE: COMMON KNOWLEDGE, COMMON UNDERSTANDING AND COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2014

Cyril Hédoin
Cyril Hédoin*
Affiliation:
University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Francecyril.hedoin@univ-reims.fr
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Abstract

This article presents a community-based account of salience as an alternative and a complement to the ‘natural salience’ approach which is endorsed by almost all game theorists who use this concept. While in the naturalistic approach, salience is understood as an objective and natural property of some entities (events, strategies, outcomes), the community-based account claims that salience is a function of community membership. Building on David Lewis’s theory of common knowledge and on some of its recent refined accounts, I suggest that salience acts as a correlating device in a correlated equilibrium. What is constitutive of salience is common understanding, the fact that agents have common knowledge that they share the same modes of reasoning with respect to a well-identified set of events. I argue that the basis for common understanding is community membership. The relevance of this account stems from the fact that it answers the objection that salience is either unnecessary or unable to account for coordination between rational agents.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , November 2014 , pp. 365 - 395
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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