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PLAUSIBILITY ORDERINGS IN DYNAMIC GAMES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 September 2014

Andrés Perea
Andrés Perea*
Affiliation:
Maastricht University, Holland
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Abstract

In this paper we explore game-theoretic reasoning in dynamic games within the framework of belief revision theory. More precisely, we focus on the forward induction concept of ‘common strong belief in rationality’ (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and the backward induction concept of ‘common belief in future rationality’ (Baltag et al. 2009; Perea 2014). For both concepts we investigate whether the entire collection of selected belief revision policies for a player can be characterized by a unique plausibility ordering. We find that this is indeed possible for ‘common strong belief in rationality’, whereas this may be impossible in some games for ‘common belief in future rationality’.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , November 2014 , pp. 331 - 364
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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