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Experimentation under Hierarchy in Local Conditions: Cases of Political Reform in Guangdong and Sichuan, China*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2014

Wen-Hsuan Tsai  and
Nicola Dean
Wen-Hsuan Tsai*
Affiliation:
Academia Sinica.
Nicola Dean
Affiliation:
National Cheng-chi University. Email: daixihan@gmail.com.
*
Email: whtsai@gate.sinica.edu.tw (corresponding author).
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Abstract

Reforms carried out by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long followed a traditional model of “experimentation under hierarchy.” This article will attempt to develop this model further by building a framework to illustrate the influence of both the political dynamics of hierarchical central–local relations and local economic circumstances in the introduction of large-scale political reforms. The initiation and expansion of “experimental points” are only permitted in those select few provinces with both favourable political and economic local conditions, allowing the CCP to minimize risk and make informed decisions regarding possibilities for nationwide reform. This article proposes that the hierarchical interaction of central and local political elites, and in particular provincial secretaries, can explain the extent of reforms, whereas the type of reform is linked to distinct provincial economic conditions and the provincial secretary's interpretation of provincial priorities. Put succinctly, the CCP's model of political reform can be specifically characterized as “experimentation under hierarchy in local conditions.” This article presents a detailed discussion of both the political and economic considerations inherent in this concept, and provides examples of reform programmes in Guangdong and Sichuan to illustrate the model in practice.

Keywords

central–local relationsChinaexperimentation under hierarchypolitical reformprovincial secretarypublic nomination and direct electionSuper Department System
Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 218 , June 2014 , pp. 339 - 358
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2014 

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Footnotes

*

This paper was presented at the Eighth Annual Asian Network for the Study of Local China (ANSLoC) Workshop on 3 May 2013 at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. The authors would like to thank Tse-Kang Leng, Jae Ho Chung, Long Yang, Szue-chin Philip Hsu, Szu-Chien Hsu, John A. Donaldson and Xu-feng Zhu for their insightful and constructive comments. In addition, we are also very grateful to the Ministry of Science and Technology in the Republic of China (ROC) for providing the funding to support our research programme.

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