¹ The ACP grouping came into existence upon the signing of the first Lomé Convention in 1975 which included former British colonies (in response to the UK's entry into the Common Market) into ‘Association’ – in addition to existing ‘Associates’ in Francophone Africa. Prior to 1975, the former colonies tied to the EEC within trade and development cooperation were known as the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM). However, the term ACP is mostly used throughout this article to avoid confusion, or else simply ‘Africa-EEC’ Association when referring to events prior to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

² This can be contrasted with the ‘technical’ literature focused on the quantitative evaluation of trade flows, aid revenues, tariff changes, amongst other empirical data. Brown, W., The European Union and Africa: the Restructuring of North-South Relations (London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 2002), p. 4Google Scholar.

³ Sayer, A., ‘Moral Economy as Critique’, New Political Economy, 12:2 (2007), p. 262CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Langan, M. ‘Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa-EU Ties: A Conceptual Reorientation of Normative Power’, New Political Economy, 17:3 (2012), pp. 243–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁸ Kawasaki, S., Origins of the Concept of ‘Eurafrican Community’ (Tokyo: Tokyo Kasei, 2000), p. 27Google Scholar, emphasis added.

⁹ Zartman, I. W., The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community (New York: Princeton, 1971), p. 1Google Scholar.

¹⁰ It is relevant to note that there are a select number of articles that could be placed within a ‘realist’ tradition, notably Farrell (2005) in her critique of the shift from Lomé's alleged ‘idealism’ to Cotonou's alleged ‘realism’, as well as authors such as Lister (1997). This ‘realist’ tradition is marked by a generally pessimistic outlook vis-à-vis Europe's ability to enact normative development agendas. Nevertheless, this realist element within the historical theoretical literature is eclipsed by the critical and liberal institutionalist schools.

¹¹ Mahler, V., ‘The Lomé Convention: Assessing a North-South Insitutional Relationship’, Review of International Political Economy, 1:2 (1994), p. 245CrossRefGoogle Scholar, provides a useful definition of this ‘liberal institutionalist’ school qua Ruggie and Krasner. He explains that liberal institutionalism ‘emphasizes the key role transnational institutions can play in increasing the level of information available to national actors and reducing the transaction costs of their external relationships, creating in them a stake in international cooperation that outweighs their short-term selfish interest’.

¹² Mahler, V., ‘The Lome Convention: Assessing a North-South Institutional Relationship’, Review of International Political Economy, 1:2 (1994), p. 233CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Rivkin, A., ‘An Economic Development Proposal for Africa: a New Multilateral Aid Organization’, International Organization, 12:3 (1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁵ President of the European Council of Ministers cited in The Courier, ‘ACP-EEC Lome III’, 89: January–February (1985), p. 7.

¹⁶ Zartman, ‘Politics of Trade Negotiations’, p. 233.

¹⁷ Zartman is identified with ‘negotiation theory’ which seeks to move beyond realist conceptions of power as material resource in order to consider relations of power. Given his favourable evaluation of Europe's ability to deliver its normative development purposes via institutional arrangements combined to negotiations that bridge existing power inequalities with the Associates, he can nevertheless be placed within the liberal institutionalist school.

¹⁸ Zartman, ‘Politics of Trade Negotiations’, p. 233.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 75–6.

²⁰ Gruhn, I., ‘The Lome Convention’, International Organization, 30:2 (1976), pp. 240–62Google Scholar.

²¹ Significantly, the EEC's granting of ‘development’ friendly trade preferences to ACP countries was largely stifled by the Common Agricultural Policy.

²² Gruhn, ‘The Lome Convention’, pp. 255–8.

²³ Nkrumah, K., Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, (London: Nelson, 1965), p. ixGoogle Scholar.

²⁴ Nkrumah, ‘Neo-colonialism’, p. 19.

²⁵ Nkrumah cited in Cosgrove, C., ‘The Common Market and its Colonial Heritage’, Journal of Contemporary History, 4:1 (1969), p. 86CrossRefGoogle Scholar, emphasis added.

²⁶ Galtung, ‘The European Community’, p. 68.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 71–2.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 84–5.

²⁹ Dolan, M., ‘The Lome Convention and Europe's Relationship with the Third World: a Critical Analysis’, Journal of European Integration, 1:3 (1978), p. 389CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁰ Dolan, ‘The Lome Convention’, p. 394.

³¹ It is not within the remit of this article to rehearse the historical empirical evidence leaning against the liberal institutionalist school. Much of the empirical evidence concerning Association can be found in what Brown, The European Union in Africa refers to as the technical literature, which provides quantitative analysis of trade and aid flows. For instance, note Fredericks's analysis of Associates' growth rates; Kreinin's evaluation of African market share; Love and Disney's assessment of preferential trade for Ethiopia; and Hewitt's evaluation of ACP supply-side constraints. There are also several empirical studies that cast doubt upon liberal institutionalists' optimism concerning EPAs. For instance, Stevens and Kennan assess regressive implications of lost tariff revenues, Christian Aid examines EU companies' domination of services industries, and Karingi et al. assess ACP deindustrialization. Nevertheless, certain technical studies present more mixed, or even positive, assessments. For instance, Morrissey and Zgovu point to gains for least development countries (LDCs) while acknowledging losses for non-LDCs, while Vollmer et al. indicate gains from interim EPAs for certain ACP states. See Friedrichs, D., ‘Association Problems of African States’, Intereconomics, 8 (1970), pp. 246–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kreinin, M. E., Trade Relations of the E.E.C. (New York: Praeger, 1974)Google Scholar; Love, J. and Disney, R., ‘The Lomé Convention: A Study of Its Likely Benefits with Special Reference to Ethiopia’, Journal of Economic Studies, 3:2 (1976), pp. 95–116CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hewitt, A., ‘The Lomé Conventions: Entering a Second Decade’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 23:2 (1984), pp. 95–115CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Steven, C. and Kennan, J., EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: The Impact of Reciprocity (Brighton: Institute for Development Studies, 2005)Google Scholar; Aid, Christian, EPAs and Investment, (London: Christian Aid, 2006)Google Scholar; Karingi, S.et al., Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa Economic Partnership Agreements (New York: UNECA, 2005)Google Scholar; Morrissey, O. and Zgovu, E., ‘The Impact of EU Economic Partnership Agreements on ACP Agriculture Imports and Welfare’, CREDIT Research Paper, No. 07/09 (Nottingham: University of Nottingham, 2009)Google Scholar; Vollmer, S.et al., ‘EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Empirical Evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa’, World Development Report (Gottingen: University of Gottingen, 2009)Google Scholar.

³² Őnis, Z and Şenses, F, ‘Rethinking the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus’, Development and Change, 36:2 (2005), p. 277CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³³ Laryea, cited in ‘Dossier: The New ACP-EU agreement’, The Courier, 181 (June–July 2000), p. 14Google Scholar.

³⁴ Gakunu cited in ‘Dossier’, The Courier, p. 19.

³⁵ Carbone, M., The European Union and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid (London: Routledge, 2007)Google Scholar.

³⁶ Interestingly, Heron and Siles-Bruges examine the European Commission' emphasis upon competitiveness as part of its Global Europe strategy. Their article provides some detailed historical background to the origins of Global Europe, with relevance for broader understandings of the Post-Washington Consensus. Siles-Brugge, G. and Heron, T., ‘Competitive Liberalisation and the “Global Europe” Services and Investment Agenda: Locating the Commercial Drivers of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 50:2 (2012), pp. 250–66Google Scholar.

³⁷ The shift from non-reciprocal to reciprocal trade was, in part, a reflection of the EU's need to conform to multilateral trade rules set out within the WTO framework. In particular, WTO judgements had ruled against EU trade preferences to ACP countries in relation to banana exports deriving (predominantly) from the Caribbean. Within the critical literature, however, there is emphasis on a multilevel game wherein the European Commission consciously places the onus upon the WTO for unpopular shifts in trade policy that are nevertheless desired by European member states in terms of trade advantages. Hurt has criticised Europe's ‘strategic attempt … to externalise responsibility for its own policy’. Hurt, S., ‘Cooperation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement Between the European Union and ACP states At the End of the Lome Convention’, Third World Quarterly, 24:1 (2003), pp. 161–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Hurt, S., ‘Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement Between the European Union and the ACP States At the End of the Lomé Convention’, Third World Quarterly, 24:1 (2003), pp. 161CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ Hurt, ‘Co-operation and Coercion?’, p. 174.

⁴⁰ Storey, A., ‘Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and Africa’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24:3 (2006), pp. 331–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ Ian Manners (2002) has provided an influential liberal assessment of the EU's normative power. This refers to the European project's own normative ontology given its foundation in the aftermath of World War as a means of protecting democracy, human rights, and social prosperity. Manners argues that the EU diffuses its egalitarian norms in its dealing with external parties. This is achieved through a variety of channels including informational diffusion (for instance, through policy documents) and direct negotiation. Manners's work has given rise to a number of liberal accounts of the EU's benevolent international actorness in terms of progressive norm diffusion, often with focus on trade and development issues. See for example, Manners, I., ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40:2 (2002), pp. 235–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Birchfield, V., ‘A Normative Power Europe Framework of Transnational Policy Formation, Journal of European Public Policy, 20:6 (2013), pp. 907–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Niemann, A. and de Wekker, T., ‘Normative Power Europe? EU Relations with Moldova’, European Integration Online Papers, 14:14 (2010), pp. 1–41Google Scholar; Oberthur, S. and Kelly, C. Roche, ‘EU Leadership in International Climate Polcy: Achievements and Challenges’, The International Spectator, 43:3 (2008), pp. 35–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A moral economy approach provides a rejoinder to this prima facie acceptance of European norms.

⁴² Arts, K. and Dickson, A., EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴³ O'Neill, J., The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics (London: Routledge, 2008)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Sayer, ‘Moral Economy as Critique’, p. 262.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 262–6.

⁴⁶ Sayer, A., Moral Economy, online paper published by the Department of Sociology (Lancaster University, 2004), available at: {http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/sayermoral-economy.pdf} accessed 8 October 2009, p. 4Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Keat, R., Every Economy is a Moral Economy, online paper published by University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1993), available at: {http://www.russellkeat.net/research/ethicsmarkets/keat_everyeconomymoraleconomy.pdf} accessed 8 October 2009Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Sayer, A., ‘Moral Economy as Critique’, New Political Economy, 12:2 (2007), pp. 261–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ With deliberate parallels to Christopher Hill's ‘capability-expectations gap’. Miu, C., ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe's International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31:3 (1993), pp. 305–28Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Sayer, ‘Moral Economy as Critique’, p. 272.

⁵¹ Langan, ‘Normative Power Europe’, pp. 244–6.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ ACP-EU, The Cotonou Agreement [2000] (European Commission: Brussels, 2006), p. 6Google Scholar, emphasis added.

⁵⁴ ACP-EU, Cotonou Agreement, p. 7, emphasis added

⁵⁵ European Commission, EU Strategy for Africa (European Commission: Brussels, 2005), p. 2Google ScholarPubMed, emphasis added.

⁵⁶ Reuters, ‘Sarkozy proposes “Eurafrica” partnership on tour’ (26 July 2007), available at: {http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL26102356} accessed 8 October 2009.

⁵⁷ ACP-EU, Cotonou Agreement, p. 7.

⁵⁸ Langan, ‘Normative Power’, pp. 244–6.

⁵⁹ Wodak, R., ‘Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis’, ZfAL, 36 (2002), p. 7, available at: {http://www.unikoblenz.de/~diekmann/zfal/zfalarchiv/zfal36_1.pdf} accessed 8 October 2009Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ It is relevant here to acknowledge arising post-structuralist accounts of global governmentality. Drawing on Foucault, scholars such as Methmann (2010) have articulated a ‘post-foundational’ account of depoliticisation. Policies may empirically ‘fail’ in terms of achieving ostensible aims but may ‘succeed’ in terms of depoliticising certain controversial issues and (hence) managing grievances that might otherwise disrupt elite power. Policies may succeed de facto by neutralising possible dissent. This post-structuralist perspective departs from the epistemological foundations of moral economy. Moreover, it would be difficult to state that ‘development’ issues have been depoliticised per se in the ACP-EU relationship – rather that there are certain dominant ‘common sense’ assumptions surrounding the marriage of free market policies to pro-poor objectives. Nevertheless, there are some interesting parallels with the above debate. See Kargiannis for an example of (an admittedly isolated) post-structuralist account of the ACP-EU relationship in which she examines the ‘efficiency’ discourse. See Methmann, C. ‘The sky's the limit: seeing global warming as global governmentality’, European Journal of International Relations, 43 (2013) pp. 323–44Google Scholar; Karagiannis, K., Avoiding Responsibility: The Politics and Discourse of European Development Policy (London: Pluto Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Foucault, M., The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 2009 [orig. pub. 1969]), p. 190Google Scholar.

⁶² It is important to note that there are avenues of contestation in relation to dominant discourses of ‘pro-poor’ free trade. A moral economy approach does not seek to deny the agency of critical actors to (re)formulate narratives that counteract idealised visions of egalitarian ACP-EU ties. Critical perspectives, whether in an academic context or in terms of non-governmental organisations, can challenge the dominant moral economy. Equally, however, counter-narratives may be assimilated into the dominant discourse of elite actors. For instance, potentially critical narratives of gender equality and participatory development have been largely integrated within Europe's free market visions of ACP poverty reduction in the Post-Washington Consensus, acting to stabilise asymmetric trade regimes.

⁶³ Foucault, ‘Archaeology’, p. 191.

⁶⁴ Cox, R., ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millenium-Journal of International Relations Studies, 10 (1981), pp. 126–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cox is often described as one of the founding fathers of contemporary neo-Gramscian scholarship in light of his seminal article on ‘social forces, states, and world orders’, which advocates the closer scrutiny of the interplay between ideas, material factors, and institutions in critical international political economy.

⁶⁵ Bieler, A., ‘Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR theory: Reflections on the Material Structure of Ideas’, Politics, 21:2 (2001), p. 99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁶⁷ Macartney, ‘Articulating Particularistic Interests’, pp. 432–3, emphasis in original.

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⁷⁰ Berry, C., ‘Rediscovering Robert Cox: Agency and the ideational in critical IPE’, Political Perspectives, 1:1 (2007), p. 24Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Hurt, ‘Cooperation and Coercion?’, p. 162.

⁷² Hurt, S., ‘The EU-SADC Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations: “Locking-In” the Neoliberal Development Model in Southern Africa’, Third World Quarterly, 33:3 (2012), pp. 495–510CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷³ This is not to suggest that there could not be a neo-Gramscian contribution to ‘moral economy’ – if such a contribution were to align with a (mild) constructivism in the study of (moral) ideas in shaping, and propelling forward, economic processes. However, given the school's apparent discomfort with constructivism any overlap would require shifts in neo-Gramscian epistemology.

⁷⁴ It could be argued here that EU elites' construction of a ‘moral economy’ in fact lays the ground for resistance to its free market policies. The Commission, in particular, may become the victim of ‘rhetorical entrapment’ – being forced to dilute market reform agendas in the name of development concerns. However, the dominance of ‘pro-poor’ free market discourse is such that this does not appear to be occurring. While certain critics do point to the discrepancies of pro-poor discourse and material outcomes, the European Commission maintains a ‘common sense’ commitment to the implementation of free market policies, even where these in fact materially transgress ostensible norms.

⁷⁵ European Commission, Towards an EU Aid for Trade Strategy – The Commission's Contribution (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), p. 2Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ European Commission, ‘Towards an EU Aid for Trade Strategy’, p. 3.

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⁸³ Ibid., p. 3.

⁸⁴ EIB, Investment Facility – Annual Report (Brussels: EIB, 2004), p. 9Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ EIB, ‘Investment Facility’ (2004), p. 9, emphasis added.

⁸⁶ Bracking, S., Money and Power: Great Predators in the Political Economy of Development (London: Pluto Press 2009), p. 41Google Scholar, emphasis added.

⁸⁷ Bracking, ‘Money and Power’, p. 41.

⁸⁸ EUObserver.com, ‘EIB: funding development through tax havens’ (25 August 2009), available at: {http://blogs.euobserver.com/gardner/2009/08/25/eib-funding-development-through-tax-havens/} accessed 20 June 2011. In addition to the case of Mauritius, EUObserver highlights EIB funding to private equity outfits, namely Shorecap International Limited, based in the Cayman Islands, another prominent tax haven.

⁸⁹ Counter Balance, Flying in the Face of Development: How European Investment Bank Loans Enable Tax Havens (Brussels: Counter Balance, 2009), p. 5Google Scholar.

⁹⁰ Open Letter of MEPs, Open Letter to the Hungarian Presidency, the President of the European Council, and the European Council on EU Public Funding for Mining, Brussels (24 May 2011)Google Scholar.

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⁹² Friends of the Earth France, The European Investment Bank: Six Years of Financing the Plundering of Africa, Executive Summary (Paris: Friends of the Earth France, 2007), p. 2Google Scholar.

⁹³ Counter Balance, Coherence for Development? Development Check of the Financing Activities of the European Investment Bank (Brussels: Counter Balance, 2009), p. 16Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

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¹⁰⁰ Counterbalance, ‘Conrad's Nightmare’, p. 4.

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¹⁰⁴ UNCTAD cited in Counterbalance, ‘Flying in the face’, p. 12.

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