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Molinism and divine prophecy of free actions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 October 2013

GRAHAM OPPY  and
MARK SAWARD
GRAHAM OPPY
Affiliation:
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton Campus, Wellington Road, Clayton VIC 3800, Australia e-mail: Graham.Oppy@monash.edu
MARK SAWARD
Affiliation:
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton Campus, Wellington Road, Clayton VIC 3800, Australia e-mail: Mark.Saward@monash.edu
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Abstract

Among challenges to Molinism, the challenge posed by divine prophecy of human free action has received insufficient attention. We argue that this challenge is a significant addition to the array of challenges that confront Molinism.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 50 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 235 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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