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Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John R. Wright
John R. Wright*
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
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Abstract

Lobbying efforts and campaign contributions from coalitions of groups are used to explain representatives' voting decisions within the U.S. House Ways and Means and Agriculture Committees. Information about which groups worked together on two controversial issues and which representatives they lobbied was obtained through personal interviews and a mail survey of professional lobbyists. The analysis reveals that committee-level voting, particularly in the Ways and Means Committee, is best explained by the total number of lobbying contacts representatives received from groups on each side of the issue. Campaign contributions proved somewhat useful for explaining groups' lobbying patterns; but it appears to be lobbying, not money, that shapes and reinforces representatives' policy decisions.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 2 , June 1990 , pp. 417 - 438
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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