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GETTIERIZED KNOBE EFFECTS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2013

James R. Beebe  and
Joseph Shea
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Abstract

We report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g. harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 219 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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