Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-7qhmt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-29T09:15:08.990Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Category specificity in mind and brain?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2001

Glyn W. Humphreys
Affiliation:
Behavioural Brain Sciences Centre, School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, United Kingdomg.w.humphreys@bham.ac.uk
Emer M. E. Forde
Affiliation:
Institute of Psychology, Aston University, The Triangle, Birmingham, B4 7ET, United Kingdome.m.e.forde@aston.ac.uk

Abstract

We summarise and respond to the main points made by the commentators on our target article, which concern: (1) whether structural similarity can play a causal role in normal object identification and in neuropsychological deficits for living things, (2) the nature of our structural knowledge of the world, (3) the relations between sensory and functional knowledge of objects, and the nature of our functional knowledge about living things, (4) whether we need to posit a “core” semantic system, (5) arguments that can be marshalled from evidence on functional imaging, (6) the causal mechanisms by which category differences can emerge in object representations, and (7) the nature of our knowledge about categories other than living and nonliving things. We also highlight points raised in our article that seem to be accepted.

Type
Author's Response
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)