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Intrinsic work motivation and pension reform preferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2012

FRIEDRICH HEINEMANN ,
TANJA HENNIGHAUSEN  and
MARC-DANIEL MOESSINGER
FRIEDRICH HEINEMANN*
Affiliation:
ZEW Mannheim and University of Heidelberg (e-mail: Heinemann@zew.de)
TANJA HENNIGHAUSEN
Affiliation:
ZEW Mannheim and University of Mannheim
MARC-DANIEL MOESSINGER
Affiliation:
ZEW Mannheim
*
*Corresponding author: Friedrich Heinemann Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)L7,1 68161 Mannheim, Germany. Tel: +49-621-1235 149.
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Abstract

Although demographic change leaves pay-as-you-go pension systems unsustainable, reforms, such as a higher pension age, are highly unpopular. This contribution looks into the role of intrinsic motivation as a driver for pension reform preferences. Theoretical reasoning suggests that this driver should be relevant as it decreases the subjective costs of a higher pension age. We test this key hypothesis on the basis of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). The results are unambiguous: in addition to factors such as age or education, the inclusion of intrinsic work motivation helps improving our prediction of an individual's reform orientation.

Keywords

D78H55H31Pension systemreformspension ageALLBUSintrinsic motivation
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Pension Economics & Finance , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , April 2013 , pp. 190 - 217
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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