The Review of Symbolic Logic

Research Articles

REVISION REVISITED

LEON HORSTENa1 c1, GRAHAM E. LEIGHa2 c2, HANNES LEITGEBa3 c3 and PHILIP WELCHa4 c4

a1 University of Bristol

a2 University of Oxford

a3 Ludwig Maximilians-Universität München

a4 University of Bristol

Abstract

This article explores ways in which the Revision Theory of Truth can be expressed in the object language. In particular, we investigate the extent to which semantic deficiency, stable truth, and nearly stable truth can be so expressed, and we study different axiomatic systems for the Revision Theory of Truth.

(Received July 26 2011)

Correspondence:

c1 LEON HORSTEN, DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL, 43 WOODLAND ROAD, BRISTOL BS81UU, UK. E-mail: Leon.Horsten@bristol.ac.uk

c2 GRAHAM LEIGH, FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, 10 MERTON STREET, OXFORD, OX14JJ, UK. E-mail: graham.leigh@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

c3 HANNES LEITGEB, FAKULTÄT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE, WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE, UND RELIGIONSWISSENSCHAFT, LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN, GESCHWISTER-SCHOLL-PLATZ 1, D-80539 MÜNCHEN, GERMANY. E-mail: Hannes.Leitgeb@lmu.de

c4 PHILIP WELCH, SCHOOL OF MATHEMATICS, UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL, HOWARD HOUSE, UNIVERSITY WALK, BRISTOL BS81TW, UK. E-mail: P.Welch@bristol.ac.uk