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Conditions of democracy-enhancing multilateralism: expansion of rights protections in Europe?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 May 2012

Abstract

As argued in a recent article by Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik, ‘democracy-enhancing multilateralism’ highlights the potential ways in which international organisations can enhance domestic democracy. The thesis raises an important question about the conditions which shape the likelihood that multilateralism will have such democratising effects. This article responds to the question of conditionality, looking at one way in which democracy may be improved by multilateralism-through the expansion of rights protections. That is, under what conditions will domestic democratic processes garner an improved ability to protect rights as a result of a state's participation in multilateral institutions? Using most likely empirical cases – the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (COE) – this article argues that three conditions affect the likelihood that rights expansion will result from multilateral legal institutions. Together the compatibility between the international legal principle and pre-existing domestic law, legal mobilisation, and the precision and obligation of the international law have significant affect on the likelihood of rights expansion. The unique contribution here is a set of conditions that helps to understand when and where rights are likely to expand as a result of a state's participation in international organisations.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2012

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References

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53 Direct discrimination occurs ‘where one person is treated less favorably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation’ (Art. 2, para 2, § (a)). Indirect discrimination occurs ‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons … at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons’ (Art. 2, para. 2, § (b)).

54 To not conflate legal issues, I include only civil administrative law cases in France.

55 I collect French litigation using LegiFrance database and British litigation using the British and Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII) database.

56 UKHL [2003] 26.

57 UKHL [2004] 33.

58 [2001] EWCA Civ 1238.

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65 The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 repealed the provision of the 1968 Caravan Sites Act that required local authorities to provide parking sites.

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67 The ECRI's second reports were the latest adopted before the time period under analysis. The ECRI 2nd Report on the UK was adopted on 16 June 2000 and the 2nd Report on France was adopted 10 December 1999.

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69 Decision No. 06PA02384. 4 May 2008 decision of the Cour administrative d'appel de Paris.

70 Chapman v The United Kingdom (Application no. 27238/95). 18 January 2001 decision of the European Court of Human Rights.

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83 Rights expansion in weaker democracies may be more profound when coercive power is placed on states from outside (not via domestic political processes) or as conditions for future membership (which is different from the claim asserted by the democracy-enhancing multilateralism thesis).

84 See, Hafner-Burton, ‘Trading Human Rights’; Greenhill, ‘The Company You Keep’.