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An intentional basis for corporate personality - RETRACTION1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2012

Anthony Amatrudo
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Abstract

This article provides a politico-jurisprudential account of the corporate personality which develops contemporary thinking about collective and shared intentions and their practical applications. It provides a model of corporate personality that is based on recent work by Bratman, Hurley, Raz and Sugden on the issues of shared intentions, interlocking preferences, and other supporting attitudes. The article will additionally detail issues of choice, coercion and will in relation to the work of scholars such as Dworkin and Velleman.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Journal of Law in Context , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 413 - 430
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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