a1 Department of Philosophy, Lund University, SE-22100 Lund, Sweden. Mathias.Osvath@lucs.lu.se http://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=693&lang=eng Tomas.Persson@lucs.lu.se http://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=692&lang=eng Peter.Gardenfors@lucs.lu.se http://www.fil.lu.se/persons/person.asp?filpers=691&lang=eng
We find problems with Vaesen's treatment of the primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic. Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.