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The Difficult Path to an Economic Rule of Law: European Competition Policy, 1950–91

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2012

LAURENT WARLOUZET  and
TOBIAS WITSCHKE
LAURENT WARLOUZET
Affiliation:
University of Artois-CREHS; 24 avenue des fleurs, F-59110 La Madeleine, France; laurent.warlouzet@univ-artois.fr
TOBIAS WITSCHKE
Affiliation:
Rue Rollebeek 24a, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgium; Tobias.witschke@eui.eu
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Abstract

A historical retelling of European competition policy is crucial to understanding the discrepancy between the rules in the treaties and their implementation. The historian must navigate treacherous waters between contrasting treaty stipulations in the ECSC and in the EEC Treaties, initial attempts at rigorous implementation but with limited effect on the ground, and a complicated relationship between the supranational institutions. Only in the 1980s did the Commission enjoy the benefits of the ECJ's supportive case law. These benefits came due to a fortunate conjuncture of political, economical and administrative factors.

Le difficile chemin vers un droit économique européen: la politique de la concurrence communautaire, 1950–91

L'histoire de la politique de la concurrence est marquée par un décalage entre les règles des traités et leur application. L'historien doit dépasser des contradictions entre des dispositions très différentes dans les deux traités CECA et CEE, une tentative d'application rigoureuse mais avec des effets limités au début, et une relation complexe entre les institutions supranationales. Il faut attendre les années 1980 pour que la Commission bénéficie pleinement de la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice. Cette situation est liée à une conjonction de facteurs politiques, économiques et administratifs très spécifique et exceptionnelle.

Der schwierige weg zu einem wirtschaftlichen ‘rechtsstaat’: die europäische wettbewerbspolititk, 1950–1991

Eine historische Analyse der Wettbewerbspolitik verdeutlicht die Unterschiede zwischen den formellen Regeln und der Rechtswirklichkeit. Der Historiker muss die Unterschiede und Widersprüche der verschiedenen Regeln im EGKS- und EWG Vertrag herausarbeiten: anfangs der Versuch einer entschlossenen Anwendung, mit noch begrenzten Ergebnissen und komplexen Beziehungen zwischen supranationalen Institutionen. Erst in den achtziger Jahren wird die Kommission vom Europäischen Gerichtshof voll unterstützt. Diese Situation erklärt sich auch aufgrund günstiger politischer und wirtschaftlicher Rahmenbedingungen.

Type
Articles
Information
Contemporary European History , Volume 21 , Issue 3: Towards a New History of European Law , August 2012 , pp. 437 - 455
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

1 The book of reference on competition policy is Cini, Michelle and McGowan, Lee, The Competition Policy in the European Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)Google Scholar.

2 For a general overview of the history of European competition policy see Laurent Warlouzet, ‘The Rise of European Competition Policy, 1950–1991: A Cross-disciplinary Survey of a Contested Policy Sphere’, European University Institute Working Paper, 80 (2010); the purpose of this article is not to discuss the competition policy implemented by the Commission from a normative point of view.

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20 Buch-Hansen and Wigger, The Politics of European Competition Regulation, 51.

21 Palayret, Jean-Marie, ‘Jean Monnet, la Haute Autorité de la CECA face au problème de la reconcentration de la sidérurgie dans la Ruhr (1950–1958)’, Revue d'Histoire diplomatique, 105 (1991), 307–48Google Scholar; Witschke, Tobias, Gefahr für den Wettbewerb? Die Rekonzentration der Ruhrstahlindustrie und die Wettbewerbspolitik der EGKS (Stuttgart: Akademieverlag, 2009), 72–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Poidevin, Raymond, Robert Schuman: Homme d'Etat 1986–1963 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1986), 284ffGoogle Scholar. On the weight of the ‘German question’ in the French Parliament, see Wenkel, Christian, ‘Inquiétudes parlementaires: La perception du problème allemand à travers les débats de la commission des Affaires étrangères de l'Assemblée nationale, 1949–1955’, Relations Internationales, 129 (2007), 85–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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27 Griffiths, ‘The Schuman Plan negotiations’, 35–71.

28 Diebold, Schuman Plan, 254–61; Witschke, Gefahr, 297–304. Judgment of the Court of 21 Dec. 1954. French Republic v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. Case 1–54.

29 Diebold, Schuman Plan, 265f. See also Lister, Louis, Europe's Coal and Steel Community (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), 237–240fGoogle Scholar.

30 Spierenburg and Poidevin, High Authority, 174 f. Witschke, Gefahr, 186–93.

31 Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), ECSC archives, CEAB 2/722 Records of the meeting of the High Authority, 22 Dec. 1954.

32 Lefèvre, Sylvie, Les relations économiques franco-allemandes de 1945 à 1955: de l'occupation à la coopération (Paris, Cheff: 1998), 390ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 The implementing provision of Article 66 only came into force in the summer 1954 after the acquisition of the Harpener Bergbau AG by the French Steel Industry. Spierenburg, High Authority, 223–36.

34 Archives of the Foreign Ministry, France (MAE): MAE DE-CE 542, Haut Commissariat de la République française en Allemagne. Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques, 23 Sept. 1953; HAEU CEAB 4/83 Division ‘Ententes et concentrations’, Luxembourg 1 Oct. 1953. Witschke, Gefahr, 181f.

35 Diebold, Schuman Plan, 369. ‘Le “Pool” Charbon-Acier, banc d'essai du Marché Commun’, Le Monde, 23 June 1957; Palayret, ‘Jean Monnet’, 338; Witschke, Gefahr, 207–12.

36 Communauté Européenne du charbon et de l'acier. Assemblée Commune. Exercice 1956–1957. Session ordinaire; Rapport fait au nom de la Commission du Marché Commun sur les concentrations d'entreprises dans la Communauté par Henri Fayat, Document N° 26, 1956–1957; Witschke, Gefahr, 209f.

37 Swann, Dennis and McLachlan, Donald L., Competition Policy in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 205Google Scholar.

38 German Federal Archives (BA), BA B 136/8364 Adenauer an Debré 19 Dec. 1959, Witschke, Gefahr, 273ff.

39 HAEU CEAB 4/817 Note Betr. Zusammenschluss ATH/Phoenix – Beschluss der Hohen Behörde vom 16. März 1960, gez. H. Matthies, BA B 136/8364 Sohl an Globke, 19 Apr. 1960; Witschke, Gefahr, 276ff.; Spierenburg and Poidevin, High Authority, 711ff.

40 Witschke, Gefahr, 280; HAEU CEAB 2/313 Records of the meeting of the High Authority 20 and 27 Apr. 1960.

41 Company archives Thyssenkrupp (TA), Sohl, Sohl an Ferry, 22 Apr. 1960.

42 BA B 136/8364 Malvestiti an Adenauer, 4 May 1960, Sohl an Adenauer 28, Apr. 1960, Malvestiti an Adenauer, 27 Sept. 1960; Witschke, Gefahr, 281.

43 HAEU CEAB 02/2453 Note fuer die Herren Mitglieder der Hohen Behörde, 18 Apr. 1963; Witschke, Gefahr, 305–10.

44 Spierenburg and Poidevin, High Authority, 717f.

45 See the explanations of the Chief Executive Officer of the ATH, Hans Günther Sohl to Heinrich von Brentano, former German Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was acting as political and legal adviser in this case for ATH, TA A 7569, Sohl an von Brentano, 28 Dec. 1963; Witschke, Gefahr, 305.

46 ‘Spaak Report’ or Rapport des chefs de délégation aux ministres des Affaires étrangères, Brussels, 21 Apr. 1956, 1st part, title 2, chapter 1 (www.cvce.lu, last visited 30 Oct. 2011).

47 Other European countries (the Netherlands, the UK) had competition policy provisions but their influence on the debate were limited: Künzler, Adrian and Warlouzet, Laurent, ‘National Traditions of Competition Policy: Their Influence on EU Competition Law and the Influence of EU Competition Law on National Competition Law Thinking’, in Patel, Kiran and Schweitzer, Heike, eds, The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

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51 Seidel, The Process of Politics, 155–63.

52 See note 46; HAEU, CM3/Nego/236, note of 20 Nov. 1956; and a historical analysis in: Warlouzet, Le choix, 273–6; Warlouzet, The Rise, 7–8.

53 See above for evidence that the High Authority's failure in this area was widely known in France. De Gaulle said about the ECSC: ‘la CECA n'a apporté aucun changement profond . . . En fin de compte, la CECA n'a eu d'effet que dans des domaines secondaires’, in MAE, PA-AP 314, 1, note on an interministerial meeting of 10 June 1958.

54 Müller-Armack gave up on his most ambitious wishes: Vermerk betreffend die Konferenz über den Gemeisamen Markt vom 05.11–07.11.1956, Bonn, 8 Nov. 1956, in Schulze, Reiner, Hoeren, Thomas, eds, Dokumente zum Europaïschen Recht, vol. 3: Kartellrecht (bis 1957) (Berlin: Springer, 2000), 204–5Google Scholar.

55 On the Regulation 17/62 negotiation, several archival-based accounts exist: Pitzer, Interessen, 341–411; Hambloch, Europaïsche, 79–126; Warlouzet, ‘The Rise’, 8–9; Warlouzet, Le choix de la CEE, 288–324.

56 The strong increase in the Commission's power – and the ‘rather revolutionary institutional machinery’ which was created – was recognised even by its staunchest opponents in this negotiation, the French government: French National Archives, 1979.0791, 265, note of Jean-Marc Boegner, 21 Dec. 1961.

57 William Vaughn, ‘Cartel Policy in the EEC. 1958–1970: The Growth of a Regulatory Network’, Ph.D thesis, University of Washington, 1973, 126–9.

58 Decision 64/566/CEE, 23 Sept. 1964.

59 Judgment of the Court of 13 July 1966, Consten and Grundig vs. Commission, joined cases 56 and 58–64, ECR 299.

60 ‘Conclusions de l'avocat général M. Karl Roemer, présentées le 27 avril 1966’, Recueil de jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes (Luxembourg: Cour de justice des Communautés Européennes), 1967, 507–56.

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62 Judgment of the Court of 30 June 1966, STM vs. MBU, Case 56–65. ECR 235.

63 On this attempt in 1971–3, see an archival-based account in: Warlouzet, ‘The Rise’, 13–15.

64 Continental Can, case IV/26811, 9 Dec.1971, JO, 1971, L282/46.

65 HAEU Archives, BAC 71/1988/1/274–276, note DG IV, Van Schlieder for Borschette, 23 Jan. 1973.

66 Judgment of the Court of 21 Feb.1973, ‘Europemballage Corporation et Continental Can Company Inc. contre Commission des Communautés européennes’, case 6–72; it was clearly interpreted as a success by the Commission: HAEU, COM (73) PV 241, 21 Feb.1973, point XIX.

67 Continental Can decision, Grounds, point 37; on the relevant market: points 31 to 37.

68 On Babcock and Wilcox: Rollings, Neil, British Business in the Formative Years of European Integration, 1945–1973 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 210–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on the CGE: Yves Bouvier, ‘La compagnie générale d'électricité: Un grand groupe industriel et l'État. Technologies, hommes et marchés. 1898–1992’, Ph.D. thesis, University Paris IV, 2005, 514.

69 Künzler and Warlouzet, ‘National Traditions’; van Waarden, Frans and Drahos, Michaela, ‘Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of Competition Policies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 6 (2002), 928–31Google Scholar.

70 The forceful Prime Minister instilled competition in previously sheltered sectors, such as the state monopolies in the utilities, but she did not reinforce the fight against cartels in other sectors (except through a 1980 law with limited consequences); Wilks, Stephen, In The Public Interest: Competition Policy and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 41–3Google Scholar.

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73 Hubert Buch-Hansen, ‘Rethinking the history of European level merger control: A critical political economy perspective’, Ph.D. thesis, Copenhagen Business School, 2008, 163.

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79 Ken George and Alexis Jacquemin, ‘Competition Policy in the European Community’, in Competition Policy in Europe, 235–7; Bulmer, ‘Institutions’, 431.

80 Pollack, Engines, 285.

81 UNICE Position papers: Merger Control, 10 Nov. 1987; Amended proposal for a merger regulation, 4 May 1988; Merger regulation, 4 Nov.1988; Draft regulation regarding the control of concentration, 17 Nov.1989; Draft regulation on concentration control, 14 Dec. 1989.

82 Commission decision of 2 Oct.1991 declaring the incompatibility with the common market of a concentration (Case No IV/M.053 – Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland).

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85 Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, Case COMP/M.2220 — General Electric/Honeywell.

86 The first fine of more than €1 billion was levied against Intel in 2009; decision of the Commission of 13 May 2009, case COMP/C-3/37.990, Intel.

87 See as an example: Pérez, Sigfrido M. Ramirez, ‘La politique de la concurrence de la Communauté Économique Européenne et l'industrie: l'exemple des accords sur la distribution automobile (1972–1985)’, in Bussière, Eric and Warlouzet, Laurent, eds, La politique de la concurrence communautaire: origines et développement, special issue of Histoire, économie & société (Paris: Armand Colin, 2008), 63–77Google Scholar.

88 See a synthesis of these heated debates in Gerber, David J., ‘Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law’, Fordham International Law Journal, 31, 5 (2007), 1235–65Google Scholar.

89 Air Tours/First Choice (6 June 2002) and Schneider/Legrand (22 Oct. 2002).