Religious Studies

Articles

Time, foreknowledge, and alternative possibilities

JEFFREY GREENa1 and KATHERIN ROGERSa2

a1 Philosophy Department, Houston Baptist University, 7502 Fondren Road, Houston, TX 77074-3298 e-mail: jgreen@hbu.edu

a2 Philosophy Department, 24 Kent Way, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 e-mail: krogers@udel.edu

Abstract

In this article we respond to arguments from William Hasker and David Kyle Johnson that free will is incompatible with both divine foreknowledge and eternalism (what we refer to as isotemporalism). In particular, we sketch an Anselmian account of time and freedom, briefly defend the view against Hasker's critique, and then respond in more depth to Johnson's claim that Anselmian freedom is incompatible with free will because it entails that our actions are ‘ontologically necessary’. In defending Anselmian freedom we argue that our ordinary intuitions do not support Johnson's case and that Anselmian freedom is compatible with deliberation.