American Political Science Review

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Understanding the Role of the European Court of Justice in European Integration

CLIFFORD J. CARRUBAa1 c1, MATTHEW GABELa2 c2 and CHARLES HANKLAa3 c3

a1 Emory University

a2 Washington University in St. Louis

a3 Georgia State University

Abstract

In 2008 we published an article finding evidence for political constraints on European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision making. Stone Sweet and Brunell (this issue) argue that our theoretical foundations are fundamentally flawed and that our empirical evidence supports neofunctionalism over intergovernmentalism “in a landslide.” We respectfully disagree with Stone Sweet and Brunell regarding both their conclusions about our theoretical arguments and what the empirical evidence demonstrates. We use this response to clarify our argument and to draw a clearer contrast between our and their perspective on the role the ECJ plays in European integration. Finally, we reevaluate their neofunctionalist hypotheses. Ultimately, we do not find support in the data for Stone Sweet and Brunell's empirical claims.

Correspondence:

c1 Clifford J. Carruba is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Emory University, 327 Tarbutton Hall, 1555 Pierce Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322 (ccarrub@emory.edu).

c2 Matthew Gabel is Professor, Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130 (mgabel@artsci.wustl.edu).

c3 Charles Hankla is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 4069, Atlanta, GA 30302 (chankla@gsu.edu).

Footnotes

We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-079084). We thank Jeffrey Staton and Nathan Jensen for valuable comments on an earlier version of this response.

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