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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2010
Ted Warfield has argued that if Ockhamism and Molinism offer different responses to the problems of foreknowledge and prophecy, it is the Molinist who is in trouble. I show here that this is not so – indeed, things may be quite the reverse.
1. Ted A. Warfield ‘Ockhamism and Molinism – foreknowledge and prophecy’, in Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 317–332.
2. E.g., Alfred J. Freddoso Introduction to Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, part IV of Concordia (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
3. Linda Zagzebski ‘Foreknowledge and free will’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/
4. E.g. Plantinga, Alvin ‘On Ockham's way out’, Faith and Philosophy, 3 (1986), 235–269CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5. See especially Warfield ‘Ockhamism and Molinism’, 323–324.
6. Thanks to Kraig Martin for helpful discussion of this paper.
