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Norms, goals, and the study of thinking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Raymond S. Nickerson
Raymond S. Nickerson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155. r.nickerson@tufts.eduhttp://ase.tufts.edu/psychology/peopleNickerson.htm
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Abstract

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that the major objective of research on human thinking should be the development of descriptive theories, and they challenge normativism – “the belief that people ought to conform to a normative standard” (target article, sect. 1, para. 10). I contend that although their argument for the importance of developing descriptive theories is compelling, normative theories are also important, not only for improving thinking but for investigating and understanding it as well.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 261 - 262
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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