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Norms for reasoning about decisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Jean-François Bonnefon
Affiliation:
CNRS and Université de Toulouse, CLLE, Maison de la Recherche, 31058 Toulouse Cedex 9, France. bonnefon@univ-tlse2.fr

Abstract

Reasoning research has traditionally focused on the derivation of beliefs from beliefs, but it is increasingly turning to reasoning about decisions. In the absence of a single, entrenched normative model, the drive toward normativism is weaker in this new field than in its parent fields. The current balance between normativism and descriptivism is illustrated by three approaches to reasoning about decisions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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