¹ CIA Intelligence Report, ‘Highland Peoples of Southeast Asia's Borderland with China: Their Potential for Subversive Insurgency’, (Central Intelligence Agency CIA/BCI50, 1970). See also Sturgeon, Janet C., Border Landscapes: The Politics of Akha Land Use in China and Thailand (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2005)Google Scholar.

² For a general critique of the state-centric centre-periphery approaches within border studies in Southeast Asia see Walker, Andrew, The Legend of the Golden Boat: Regulation, Trade and Traders in the Borderlands of Laos, Thailand, Burma and China, Anthropology of Asia Series (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

³ Horstmann, Alexander and Wadley, Reed L. (eds), Centering the Margin: Agency and Narrative in Southeast Asian Borderlands (New York: Berghahn Books., 2006)Google Scholar; Sturgeon, Border Landscapes.

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⁹ Ian G. Baird, ‘Making Spaces: The Ethnic Brao People and the International Border between Laos and Cambodia’, Geoforum (In Press).

¹⁰ BPS-KH, Kabupaten Kapuas Hulu Dalam Angka 2006 (Putussibau: Badan Pusat Statistik, Kabupaten Kapuas Hulu, 2006)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Unless otherwise indicated ‘borderland’ refers to this particular stretch of the border.

¹² Eilenberg, Michael and Wadley, Reed L., ‘Borderland Livelihood Strategies: The Socio-Economic Significance of Ethnicity in Cross-Border Labour Migration, West Kalimantan, Indonesia’, Asia Pacific Viewpoint 50, no. 1 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ See Wadley, Reed L., ‘Trouble on the Frontier: Dutch-Brooke Relations and Iban Rebellion in the West Borneo Borderlands (1841–86)’, Modern Asian Studies 35, no. 03 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Layang, Jacobus Frans, Implikasi Ketertinggalan Pembangunan Kawasan Perbatasan Terhadap Ketahanan Nasional (Pontianak: Romeo Grafika Pontianak, 2006)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Subritzky, John, Confronting Sukarno (New York: St. Martins Press, INC., 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jones, Matthew, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Singapore and Brunei decided not to become part of the federation and instead created their own independent states.

¹⁷ See Tuck, Christopher, ‘Borneo 1963–66: Counter-Insurgency Operations and War Termination’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 15, no. 3 (2004)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ It is here important to remember that there is no one standard view of Sukarno's motivations behind his confrontational policy. Several scholars mention Sukarno's ambitions of Indonesia taking control of the region through its leadership of a conglomeration or association including Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia known as ‘Maphilindo’ as one such motivation. A strong British presence in the region was seen as a major treat for the creation of Maphilindo. See for example Gregorian, Raffi, ‘Claret Operations and Confrontation, 1964–66’, Conflict Quarterly XI, no. 1 (1991)Google Scholar. Others mention that Sukarno's allegations of neo-colonialism was a smoke screen for engaging the military in the conflict and thereby keeping it occupied as part of a domestic power struggle. See Sodhy, Pamela, ‘Malaysian-American Relations During Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia, 1963–66’, Journal of Southeast Asian studies XIX, no. 1 (1988): pp. 113–14Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Easter, David, ‘“Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling”: Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965–March 1966’, Cold War History 5, no. 1 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ Majid, Harun Abdul, Rebellion in Brunei: The 1962 Revolt, Imperialism, Confrontation and Oil (London/New York: I.B.Tauris, 2007), pp. 76–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brackman, Arnold C., Southeast Asia's Second Front (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p. 140Google Scholar.

²¹ Mackie, J. A. C., Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute. 1963–1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 117Google Scholar. In 1946 Sarawak became a British crown colony.

²² The leader of the rebellion was a Brunei politician, A. M. Azahari, who was originally educated in Indonesia where he was also active in the Indonesia independence struggle against the Dutch. See Stockwell, A. J., ‘Britain and Brunei, 1945–1963: Imperial Retreat and Royal Ascendancy’, Modern Asian Studies 38, no. 04 (2004): p. 793Google Scholar.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Harold, James and Sheil-Small, Denis, The Undeclared War (London: Leo Cooper Ltd, 1971)Google Scholar.

²⁵ Fujio, Hara, ‘The North Kalimantan Communist Party and the People's Republic of China’, The Developing Economies XLIII, no. 4 (2005)Google Scholar.

²⁶ Dennis, Peter and Grey, Jeffrey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966 (St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1996)Google Scholar; Pugsley, Christopher, From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and Borneo 1949–1966 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)Google Scholar.

²⁷ Tuck, ‘Borneo 1963–66’, p. 93.

²⁸ Dayak is an umbrella term used for the native ethnic groups of Kalimantan.

²⁹ Porritt, Vernon L., The Rise and Fall of Communism in Sarawak 1940–1990 (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2004), p. 89Google Scholar.

³⁰ Harold and Sheil-Small, The Undeclared War, p. 60.

³¹ A Special Forces unit locally known as the Red Berets that later evolved into the notorious Kopassus elite force.

³² Personal interview, 23 July 2007.

³³ Personal interview, 7 July 2007.

³⁴ Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation.

³⁵ KPM, Indonesian Aggression against Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Kementerian Penerangan Malaysia, 1965), p. 1Google Scholar.

³⁶ See van der Bijl, Nick, Confrontation: The War with Indonesia 1962–1966 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2007)Google Scholar.

³⁷ Another motive for the Indonesian government's heavy militarizing of Kalimantan and stationing of thousands of troops both during the latter part of Konfrontasi and the subsequent communist uprooting was to subdue regional separatist aspirations. In the late period of Dutch colonialism and just after Indonesian independence ideas of a Pan-Dayak identity and separatism were emerging in Kalimantan. See Davidson, Jamie S., ‘Primitive Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Dayak Unity Party in West Kalimantan, Indonesia’ Asia Research Institute, Working Paper Series 9 (2003)Google Scholar. For example, in 1945 Iban leaders from both sides of the border met to discuss ideas of separatism and their possible role to play in an independent Pan-Dayak state. See Wadley, Reed L., ‘The Road to Change in the Kapuas Hulu Borderlands: Jalan Lintas Utara’, Borneo Research Bulletin 29 (1998)Google Scholar.

³⁸ McKeown, Francis, The Merakai Iban: An Ethnographic Account with Special Reference to Dispute Settlement (Ph.D. dissertation: Monash University, 1984), pp. 103–05Google Scholar; Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 212–213.

³⁹ KPM, Indonesian Aggression against Malaysia, p. 1.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

⁴¹ Iban trackers were also brought over from Sarawak to the Malaysian peninsular to help track down communists during the post-war (anti-communist) Emergency campaigns in the late 1940s. See Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation; McMichael, Scott R., A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry (Forth Leavenworth: Research survey, Combat Studies Institute No. 6, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Among these trackers were not only Sarawak Iban; a large group of Kalimantan Iban from the Lanjak area also joined the fighting. After the end of the Emergency campaign on the Malay peninsular most of these men remained in what later became the new Malaysian Federation but upheld their cross-border connections.

⁴² The Malaysian and Commonwealth troops erected army camps in Batu Lintang, Lubok Antu and Jambu across the border in Sarawak just opposite the Indonesian camps. See Gurr, Robert, Voices from a Border War: 1 Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment, 1963 to 1965 (Melbourne: R. M. Gurr, 1995), pp. 106–107Google Scholar.

⁴³ The CLARET operations were kept a secret by the Commonwealth forces even after the end of Confrontation. Afraid that it would strain its relations with Indonesia, Australia, for example, first recognized its involvements in these secret incursions on Indonesian territory as late as 1996. See Mark Forbes, ‘Truth Still a Casualty of Our Secret War’, The Age, 23 March 2005.

⁴⁴ Carlin, Thomas M., Claret the Nature of War and Diplomacy: Special Operations in Borneo 1963–1966 (Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1993)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ See Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation; Gregorian, ‘Claret Operations and Confrontation, 1964–1966.’

⁴⁶ See Iwan Meulia Pirous, ‘Life on the Border: Iban between Two Nations’, Latitudes, September 2002; Dickens, Peter, Sas the Jungle Frontier: 22 Special Air Service Regiment in the Borneo Campaign 1963–1966 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ McKeown, The Merakai Iban, p. 105; Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 213.

⁴⁸ Stephen Kalong Ningkam was an influential politician of mixed Iban/Chinese decent from the Katibas region in Sarawak just opposite the border who held the position of Chief Minister from 1963–1966.

⁴⁹ See also Christine Padoch who has noted similar emigration of Kalimantan Iban from the upper Kapuas River into Sarawak during Confrontation in order to escape harassment by members of the Indonesian military. See Padoch, Christine, Migration and Its Alternatives among the Ibans of Sarawak (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 31Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Gurr, Voices from a Border War, p. 109.

⁵¹ For detailed accounts of the numerous clashes between the Indonesian Army and Commonwealth troops in the Nanga Badau-Lubok Antu area see Ibid., pp. 85–102.

⁵² Personal interview, 23 March 2007.

⁵³ On the Commonwealth troop build-up on the Sarawak side of the Perayung hills and their bombing across the border, see also Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation, pp. 314–315. Still today the hilly borderland is littered with old dirt trenches and unexploded bombs.

⁵⁴ Personal interview, 22 June 2007.

⁵⁵ See Smith, Neil, Nothing Short of War: With the Australian Army in Borneo 1962–66 (Brighton, Victoria: Citadel Press, 1999), p. 7Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ The ambiguous affairs behind this coup attempt that later led the way for the overthrow of President Sukarno is still highly controversial.

⁵⁷ Layang, Implikasi Ketertinggalan.

⁵⁸ Personal interview, 23 July 2007.

⁵⁹ Heidhues, Mary Somers, Golddiggers, Farmers, and Traders in the ‘Chinese District’ of West Kalimantan, Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 2003), pp. 243–244CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁰ Pidato P.R.I., ‘Pidato Kenegaraan: Presiden Republik Indonesia, Djeneral Soeharto’, (Jakarta: 1968), pp. 83–84.

⁶¹ Here I deliberately place the term ‘insurgency’ within quotation marks as it is important to remember that the term ‘insurgency’ carries a negative conation that the rebels’ cause is illegitimate, whereas the rebels themselves see the government authority itself as being illegitimate.

⁶² Rachman, Ansar et al. , Tanjungpura Berdjuang—Sejarah Kodam Xii/Tanjungpura, Kalimantan Barat (Pontianak: Kodam Tanjungpura, Kalimantan Barat 1970), p. 239Google Scholar.

⁶³ This major military operation was carried out in three periods, Operasi Sapu Bersih I (1967), II (1967–1969) and III (1969–1970). See Soemadi, , Peranan Kalimantan Barat Dalam Menghadapi Subversi Komunis Asia Tenggara: Suatu Tinjauan Internasional Terhadap Gerakan Komunis Dari Sudut Pertahanan Wilayah Khususnya Kalimantan Barat (Pontianak: Yayasan Tanjungpura, 1974)Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 93.

⁶⁵ Rachman et al., Tanjungpura Berdjuang, pp. 295–297.

⁶⁶ van Der Kroef, Justus M., ‘The Sarawak-Indonesia Border Insurgency’, Modern Asian Studies 2, no. 3 (1968): p. 263Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ KODAM XXI/Tanjunpura accounts.

⁶⁸ Rachman et al., Tanjungpura Berdjuang, p. 295.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 319.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 295, 319.

⁷¹ The Sarawak Special Branch was originally created in 1949 to collect intelligence on various subversive activities and secessionist movements including those inspired by communism. This special unit of the police later played an important role in curbing the spread of communist ‘propaganda’ in the state during the 1960s and 1970s.

⁷² Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat, p. 96; Rachman et al., Tanjungpura Berdjuang, pp. 320–321.

⁷³ See Tempo, ‘166.129 Orang Itu Mau Kemana; Dari Wna Ke Wni’, Tempo, Edisi 24/04, 17 August 1974; Tempo, ‘Bedil Serawak’, Tempo, Edisi 27/04, 7 September 1974.

⁷⁴ Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat, p. 91.

⁷⁵ Davidson, Jamie S. and Kammen, Douglas, ‘Indonesia's Unknown War and the Lineages of Violence in West Kalimantan, Indonesia’, Indonesia 73, no. April (2002): pp. 17–18Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ Peluso, Nancy Lee, ‘Rubber Erasures, Rubber Producing Rights: Making Racialized Territories in West Kalimantan, Indonesia’, Development and Change 40, no. 1 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁷ Tempo, ‘Sepucuk Telegram Dari Gerombolan; Cerita Di Balik Kamp Pgrs’, Tempo, Edisi 33/01, 16 October 1971.

⁷⁸ Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat.

⁷⁹ The four other areas were Sajingan (Sambas district), Balai Karangan (Sanggau district), Senaning and Sungai Antu (Sintang district). See Tempo, ‘Membenahi Perbatasan’, Tempo, Edisi 17/04, 29 June 1974.

⁸⁰ See Ibid;Tempo, ‘Bedil Serawak’.

⁸¹ Peluso, Nancy Lee and Harwell, Emily, ‘Territory, Custom and the Cultural Politics of Ethnic War in West Kalimantan, Indonesia’, in Violent Environments (ed.), Watts, Michael and Peluso, Nancy Lee (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001)Google Scholar.

⁸² Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat, pp. 140–145; Tempo, ‘Sepucuk Telegram Dari Gerombolan.’

⁸³ Davidson and Kammen, ‘Indonesia's Unknown War’, p. 25.

⁸⁴ Growing hill rice plays a vital role in the Iban social and spiritual way of life and many of the more conservative Iban are extremely reluctant to give up this form of rice cultivation.

⁸⁵ Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat, pp. 96–99.

⁸⁶ Rachman et al., Tanjungpura Berdjuang, p. 295.

⁸⁷ Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat, p. 104.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 124.

⁸⁹ Pancasila relies on five principles; (1) Monotheism, (2) Humanism, (3) The unity of nationalism, (4) Democracy through representative government, (5) Social justice.

⁹⁰ For a more detailed discussion of national schooling in the borderland and the paradoxical outcomes see Eilenberg, Michael, ‘Paradoxical Outcomes of National Schooling in the Borderland of West Kalimantan, Indonesia: The Case of the Iban’, Borneo Research Bulletin 36 (2005)Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Personal interview, 30 May 2007.

⁹² Tempo, ‘Agama & Perut’, Tempo, Edisi 34/04, 26 October 1974.

⁹³ Anonymous, ‘Apostolisch Vicariaat Van Borneo: De School Te Landjah Gesloten’, Onze Missiën in Oost- en West-Indië: Tijdschrift der Indische Missie-Vereeniging 5, no. 58–60 (1921–1922)Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ Buil, Gonzales, ‘De Geschiedenis Van Landjah’, Borneo-Almanak 11, no. 69–74 (1921)Google Scholar. See also Kroniek over de Missie van Borneo, samengesteld door Valentinus, 27 January 1954. Kapucijnenarchief, Archivum Capuccinorum Hollandvae (ACH), s-Hertogenbosch, The Netherlands.

⁹⁵ See Letters from Lanjak 1908–1917, to Pater Provinciaal. 30 September 1912, P. Ignatius. Kapucijnenarchief, Archivum Capuccinorum Hollandvae (ACH), s-Hertogenbosch, The Netherlands.

⁹⁶ Eilenberg and Wadley, ‘Borderland Livelihood Strategies’.

⁹⁷ The rebels were divided into two groups concentrating on different parts of the West Kalimantan-Sarawak border. The PARAKU mostly operated in the remote eastern reaches of the border (Sintang, Kapuas Hulu) while the PGRS (Pasukan Gerilya Rayakat Serawak) operated in the western parts.

⁹⁸ Sulistyorini, Pembayun, ‘Pemberontakan Pgrs/Paraku Di Kalimantan Barat’, Jurnal Sejarah dan Budaya Kalimantan 3 (2004)Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ According to Fujio Hara, a Sarawak Iban named Ubong was appointed deputy commander of the PARAKU in the late 1970s. See Fujio, ‘The North Kalimantan Communist Party’, p. 502.

¹⁰⁰ For a detailed description of the general political dynamics in West Kalimantan during the era of militarization see Davidson, Jamie S., Violence and Politics in West Kalimantan, Indonesia (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science: University of Washington, 2002)Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ Rahman, Mohd Daud Bin Abdul, The Threat of Armed Communism in Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Penchetak Kerajaan, 1972)Google Scholar.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 2. It is important to remember that this White Paper was part of Malaysian Government anti-communist propaganda.

¹⁰³ Conboy, Ken, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces (Jakarta/Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2003), p. 95Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ Whether this statement is true is difficult to assess; local rumours say that instructors from the RRC entered Kalimantan during this period, but it is more likely that the General Peng mentioned here was a Sarawak Chinese trained in China. Like the PARAKU, many of the TNKU soldiers used an alias. However, in his account of the military involvement in fighting the PARAKU, General Soemadi mentions the 1971 surrender of a rebel leader named Sim Kiem Peng from the PARAKU Unit Satuan 330 who operated in the Lanjak area. See Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat, pp. 130–131.

¹⁰⁵ Personal interview, 23 March 2007.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ van der Kroef, Justus M., ‘Indonesian Communism since the 1965 Coup’, Pacific Affairs 43, no. 1 (1970): p. 49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ Porritt, The Rise and Fall of Communism, p. 164.

¹⁰⁹ Rahman, The Treat, p. 15.

¹¹⁰ See also Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat, p. 94.

¹¹¹ Personal interview, 10 April 2007.

¹¹² See Tempo, ‘Siapakah Kie Chok’, Tempo, Edisi 33/01, 16 October 1971.

¹¹³ For similar statements see McKeown, The Merakai Iban, p. 105.

¹¹⁴ Personal interview, 23 July 2007.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ See H. A. M Japari, ‘Buku I: Pembangunan Jalan Darat Di Kabupaten Dati Ii Kapuas Hulu Sebagai Upaya Membuka Isolasi Daerah’, (Putussibau: Pemerintah Kabupaten Daerah Tingkat II Kapuas Hulu, 1989), p. 11.

¹¹⁷ Personal interview, 23 July 2007.

¹¹⁸ See Lumenta, Dave, ‘Borderland Identity Construction within a Market Place of Narrative. Preliminary Notes on the Batang Kanyau Iban in West Kalimantan’, Masyarakat Indonesia-Majalah Ilmu-Ilmu Social Indonesia XXX, no. 2 (2005)Google Scholar; Pirous, ‘Life on the Border.’

¹¹⁹ Personal interview, 14 July 2007.

¹²⁰ Just across the border in the Lubok Antu several Iban leaders were arrested and accused by Malaysian Forces of supplying food and intelligence to the PARAKU. For example, in 1968, ten Iban headmen were arrested in Lubok Antu accused of colluding with the communists. See Porritt, The Rise and Fall of Communism, p. 164.

¹²¹ The military policy of intimidation and violence was also widely felt among other Dayak communities living along the lower parts of the border. See Peluso, Nancy Lee, ‘A Political Ecology of Violence and Territory in West Kalimantan’, Asia Pacific Viewpoint 49, no. 1 (2008)Google Scholar.

¹²² Personal interview, 8 June 2007.

¹²³ This incident is also noted in General Soemadi's 1974 account of the PARAKU period. See Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat, pp. 130–131.

¹²⁴ Personal interview, 9 June 2007.

¹²⁵ Wadley, Reed L., ‘Frontiers of Death: Iban Expansion and Inter-Ethnic Relations in West Borneo’, International Institute for Asian Studies Newsletter 24 (2001)Google Scholar.

¹²⁶ Reed L. Wadley has noted how the same term was used to describe the period of raiding and punitive expeditions during colonial times. See Wadley, Reed L., ‘Punitive Expeditions and Divine Revenge: Oral and Colonial Histories of Rebellion and Pacification in Western Borneo, 1886–1902’, Ethnohistory 51, no. 3 (2004): p. 628CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹²⁷ Davidson and Kammen, ‘Indonesia's Unknown War’, p. 31.

¹²⁸ The Wanra were a kind of local civil defence unit (Pertahanan Sipil or Hansip). See Sundhaussen, Ulf, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945–1967 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 192–193Google Scholar.

¹²⁹ See also Presidential Decree no. 4 of 15 March 1965.

¹³⁰ See McKeown, The Merakai Iban, pp. 384–385.

¹³¹ See Bala, Changing Borders and Identities.

¹³² van der Kroef, Justus M., ‘Indonesia, Malaya, and the North Borneo Crisis’, Asian Survey 3, no. 4 (1963): p. 255Google Scholar.

¹³³ Porritt, The Rise and Fall of Communism, pp. 157–158.

¹³⁴ Personal interviews, 19 and 21 March 2007.

¹³⁵ Wadley, Reed L. and Eilenberg, Michael, ‘Vigilantes and Gangsters in the Borderland of West Kalimantan, Indonesia’, in State, People and Borders in Southeast Asia (ed.), Horstmann, Alexander (A Special Issue of The Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Vol. 7, 2006)Google Scholar.

¹³⁶ Tempo, ‘Sepucuk Telegram Dari Gerombolan’.

¹³⁷ Personal interview, 9 April 2007.

¹³⁸ Effendy, Machrus, Penghancuran Pgrs-Paraku Dan Pki Di Kalimantan Barat (Jakarta: P.T. Dian Kemilau, 1995)Google Scholar.

¹³⁹ Personal interview, 9 March 2007.

¹⁴⁰ Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat, p. 163.

¹⁴¹ Lumenta, ‘Borderland Identity Construction’, p. 17.

¹⁴² See Conboy, Kopassus, p. 148.

¹⁴³ Colonel Soemadi is not to be confused with Brigadier General Soemadi mentioned earlier.

¹⁴⁴ As rewards for their loyalty towards the New Order government, several well-connected Iban were, together with Military officers, given control of large timber concessions in the borderland. See Eilenberg, Michael, ‘Negotiating Autonomy at the Margins of the State: The Dynamics of Elite Politics in the Borderland of West Kalimantan, Indonesia’, South East Asia Research 17, no. 2 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴⁵ Personal interview, 23 March 2007.

¹⁴⁶ ‘Sri Aman’ is a Malay phrase for peace and after the signing of the memorandum the town of Simanggang was renamed Sri Aman to commemorate the agreement. However, until today the Iban still use the former name of the town.

¹⁴⁷ Fujio, ‘The North Kalimantan Communist Party’.

¹⁴⁸ Pidato P. R. I., ‘Pidato Pertanggungan Jawab Presiden/Mandataris Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia: Presiden Republik Indonesia, Djeneral Soeharto’, (Jakarta: 1972).

¹⁴⁹ For similar claims see also Japari, ‘Buku I’, pp. 11–12. Japari was District head of Kapuas Hulu from 1985–1995.

¹⁵⁰ Davidson and Kammen, ‘Indonesia's Unknown War’, p. 33.

¹⁵¹ Lumenta, ‘Borderland Identity Construction’, p. 20.

¹⁵² Porritt, The Rise and Fall of Communism.

¹⁵³ Eilenberg and Wadley, ‘Borderland Livelihood Strategies’.

¹⁵⁴ Personal interview, 13 March 2007.

¹⁵⁵ Eilenberg, ‘Negotiating Autonomy’.