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METHODS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE'S JURISPRUDENCE: 2000–2009

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2011

Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez
Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez*
Affiliation:
Doctor of Laws and Adjunct Professor, University of Ottawa.
*
Email: aalvarez@uottawa.ca.
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Extract

‘Sometimes the most important historical events are the non-events: the things that did not occur,’ says the British historian Niall Ferguson.1 Such a statement may well describe in large measure the International Court of Justice's case-law regarding the methods for the identification of rules of customary international law during the period 2000–2009. The previous two decades had been marked by two milestones in this domain: the eighties by the judgment on the merits in Nicaragua,2 and the nineties by the Court's advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons.3 There was, though, no single decision by the Court of comparative significance regarding methods of customary international law during the first decade of the new millennium. Further, some of the most important determinations in this domain were those in which the Court did not declare the existence of a customary international rule. However, this is not to say that the above-mentioned conclusion applies to all of the Court's jurisprudence related to customary international law. The conclusion is limited to the Court's decisions regarding the methods for the recognition of norms of this character. In fact, the Court made very important pronouncements as to the content of customary international law in many domains, such as the use of force, territorial occupation, diplomatic protection, and international humanitarian law.

Type
Article
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 60 , Issue 3 , July 2011 , pp. 681 - 712
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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References

1 N Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (Allen Lane, London, 2009) 165.

2 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua. (Nicaragua v United States of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.

3 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 226.

4 There is the pretension, criticized by the French historian Michel de Certeau, in the selection of historical periods of ignoring what has happened before. See M de Certeau, ‘Escrituras e Historias’, in Francisco Ortega (ed), La Irrupción de lo Impensado (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, 2004) 132–33. Two comments are worth making in this regard for the purpose of this paper. The first, and obvious one given the relatively short existence of the Court, is that, although the focus is on the case-law of the first decade of the new millennium jurisprudence, the article does take into consideration Court's pronouncements prior to the period under analysis in order to offer a more complete assessment of the main topic and to avoid such pretension. The second is that I do not claim that the richness of the Court's jurisprudence regarding methods for the identification of customary international law during 2000–2009 only started occurring during this period.

5 See Statute of the International Court of Justice.

6 Waldock, H, ‘The International Court of Justice as Seen From the Bar and Bench’, (1983) 54 British Yearbook of International Law 1, 4Google Scholar.

7 R Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) 202.

8 Nuclear Weapons (n 3) para 18.

9 See Nicaragua (n 2) paras 218–220.

10 T Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Brill, Leiden, 2006) 403.

11 Higgins, R, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law’, (2003) 52 ICLQ 1, 8–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v. Council of the European Union [1997] ECR II–39, 90, 93.

13 See Case Concerning The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 51.

14 See L de Chazournes and S Heathcote, ‘The Role of the New International Adjudicator’, in DJ Bederman and L Reed (eds) ‘The Visible College of International Law’, Proceedings of the 95th Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law, Washington, 2001) 129, 133.

15 See, for instance, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. the Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID, Case No. ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, 315. Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets v. Argentina, Award, ICSID, Case No. ARB/01/3, IIC 292, 22 May 2007, 265–8, and 275–7.

It is worth-mentioning that, although using the customary rule of necessity to interpret BIT necessity clauses has been regarded an error of law, such declaration does not affect the influence that the Court's pronouncement had on the tribunals. For the reasons supporting the declaration of existence of the said error, see, for instance, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, Case No ARB/01/8, ICSID, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic 25 September 2007, 132.

16 See, for instance, Decision on Liability in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A, and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. the Argentine Republic; AWG Group v. the Argentine Republic, 30 July 2010 available at <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/VivendiSecondAnnulmentDecision.pdf>, accessed January 13 2011, 258.

17 Academic scholarship regarding the debate over the interactions between BIT necessity clauses and the customary rule of necessity abounds. See, for instance, A Bjorklund, ‘Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure’, in P Muchlinski, F Ortino and C Schreuer (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP, Oxford, 2008) 459; Alvarez, J and Khamsi, K, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors. A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime’, (2008) 1 Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 379Google Scholar; Alvarez-Jiménez, A, ‘New Approaches to the State of Necessity in Customary International Law: Insights from WTO Law and Foreign Investment Law’, (2008) 19 American Review of International Arbitration 463Google Scholar; and A Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘Foreign Investment Protection and Regulatory Failures as States’ Contribution to the State of Necessity under Customary International Law: A New Approach Based on the Complexity of Argentina's 2001 Crisis', (2010) 27 Journal of International Arbitration 141.

18 D'Amato, A, ‘Trashing Customary International Law’ (1987) 81 AJIL 101CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 104.

19 See (n 5).

20 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany /Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3.

21 ibid.

22 See ibid 72–74.

23 ibid 77. For a detailed analysis of this judgment regarding customary international law, see Haggenmacher, P, ‘La Doctrine de Deux Éléments du Droit Coutumier Dans la Pratique de la Cour Internationale’, (1986) LXXXX Revue Générale de Droit International Public 1Google Scholar.

24 See Nicaragua (n 2) 186.

25 See ibid 188.

26 See ibid 174.

27 O Schachter, ‘New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice’ in J Makarczyk (ed), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzysztof Skubieszewski (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, Leiden, 1996) 531, 532.

28 Meron, T, ‘Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law’, (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 817, 819CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 UNGA Res 49/75 (K) (15 December 1994). A strict application of Nicaragua would have eventually led to the declaration that the use of nuclear weapons was condemned by customary international law. In effect, on November 24, 1961, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1653(XVI) declaring the use of nuclear weapons ‘a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations.’ Nuclear Weapons (n 3) 71. Moreover, since 1961, according to the Court, the General Assembly had enacted resolutions each year invoking Resolution 1653 and requesting member States to conclude a treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons. Such resolutions, said the Court, had been adopted by large majorities. See ibid 73.

30 See ibid 70–73.

31 For a complete assessment of this advisory opinion, see L de Chazournes and P Sands International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons (CUP, Cambridge, 1999).

32 See Roberts, AE, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’, (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 757, 768CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 See ibid 769.

34 See ibid 764–66.

35 See D'Amato (n 18) 102.

36 See Roberts (n 32) 769.

37 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=51&case=116&code=co&p3=4> accessed 7 February 2011, 213–14.

38 See ibid 214. The Court relied on its previous advisory opinion in Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights [1999] ICJ Rep 62, 87.

39 Armed Activities (n 37) 214.

40 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep 136, 87. For assessment of this opinion, see Breau, SC, ‘Decisions of International Tribunals: International Court of Justice: Part I. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004’, (2005) 54 ICLQ 1003Google Scholar; and Robledo, JM, ‘L'Avis de la C.I.J sur les Conséquences Juridiques de L‘Edification D'un Mur Dans le Territoire Palestinien Occupé: Timidité ou Prudence?’, (2005) 109 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 521Google Scholar.

41 Wall Opinion (n 40) 87.

42 See A Roberts, ‘Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights’, in M Schmitt and J Pejic (eds), International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines. Essays in Honour of Yoram Dinstein (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2007) 439, 442.

43 Armed Activities (n 37) 162.

44 ibid 162.

45 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (adopted 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 April 1964), United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 500, p. 223.

46 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment of 4 June 2008, 174, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=93&case=136&code=djf&p3=4>, accessed 21 January 2011.

47 See <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-3&chapter=3&lang=en>, accessed 22 January 2011.

48 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 1155, p. 331.

49 International Court of Justice, LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=04&case=104&code=gus&p3=4 accessed 7 January 2011, [101]. For an evaluation of more contemporary use of Art 33(4), see A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn CUP, Cambridge, 2007) 2, 53–55.

50 See LaGrand (n 49) 102–109.

51 See Fitzpatrick, J, ‘The Unreality of International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case’, (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 427Google Scholar; Crook, JR, ‘The 2001 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice’, (2002) 96 AJIL 397, 401CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Matringe, J, ‘L'Arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice dans L'Affaire La Grand (Allemagne c Etats-Unis d'Amerique) du 27 Juin 2001’, (2002) XLVIII Annuaire Français de Droit International 215, 239Google Scholar (status of Art 33(4) referred to without comment).

52 See Aust (n 49) 11.

53 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, 11. See Fabri, HR and Sorel, JM, ‘Chronique de Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice’, (2003) 130 Journal de Droit International 855, 863Google Scholar.

54 See Arrest Warrant, (n 53) 53.

55 See ibid.

56 See ibid 54.

57 See ibid 56.

58 ibid 58.

59 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, 7.

60 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, 14.

61 See Meron (n 10) 403 and, similarly, Crook, JR, ‘The 2002 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice’, (2003) 97 AJIL 352, 354CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

62 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo. (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Preliminary Objections of 24 May 2007, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf> accessed 10 February 2011.

63 See ibid 15.

64 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 70.

65 Diallo (n 62) 90.

66 The ICJ did not quote its previous judgment in North Sea Continental Shelf as a basis to reject Guinea's claim. Such absence does not prevent me from arguing that the ICJ applied the strict approach toward the recognition of customary rules of international law, since the conclusion of the ICJ shows that it did not apply the flexible approach of Nicaragua. In addition, and as Frouville states, there is a lack of opinio juris in the situation the Court alludes to. See Frouville, O, ‘Affaire Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Républic de Guinée c. République Démocratique du Congo). Exceptions Préliminaires: Le Roman Inachevé de la Protection Diplomatique’, (2007) LIII Annuaire Français de Droit International 291, 319Google Scholar.

67 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine), Judgment of 3 February 2009, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=95&case=132&code=ru&p3=4> accessed 7 February 2011, 116–22. See Lathrop, CG, ‘Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine)’, (2009) 103 AJIL 543, 546Google Scholar.

68 Black Sea, (n 67) 211, 212.

69 Effectivités are defined as ‘the effective exercise of powers appertaining to the authority of the State over a given territory.’ International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, 172.

70 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, Judgment of 23 May 2008, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=2b&case=130&code=masi&p3=4>, last visited 10 February 2010, 149. For a detailed analysis of this finding, see Bories, C, ‘L'Arrêt de la Cour Internationale de Justice du 23 Mai 2008 dans L'Affaire Souveraineté sur Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge (Malaisie/Singapour)’, (2008) LIV Annuaire Français de Droit International 227, 235Google Scholar. For an assessment of this judgment, although without touching on the specific issue dealt here with, see Lathrop, CG, ‘Sovereignty over Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Edge (Malaysia/Singapore)’, (2008) 102 AJIL 828CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71 For instance, the Court found the following, among others: the adoption of legislation dealing with the given territory, (see Sovereignty over Pedra Blanca (n 70) 173–74); and installation of military communications equipment in the territory under dispute (see ibid 248).

72 Wall Opinion (n 40) 88. Judge Higgins highlighted the lack of justification for the position the Court took regarding self-determination. See Judge Higgins Opinion, 30.

73 Wall Opinion (n 40) 89.

74 The point worth highlighting is that judicial decisions were invoked as part of the justification of such a character. The Court ratified this customary character in Armed Activities on the basis of its prior decision in the Wall opinion and applied it to the dispute. Neither the DRC nor Uganda was party to the Regulations. See Armed Activities (n 37) 217, 219.

For analysis of the customary character of the Hague Regulations, see G Fox, Humanitarian Occupation (CUP, Cambridge, 2009) 224, and Meron, T, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, (2000) 81 AJIL 348CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

75 Nicaragua (n 2) 184.

76 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment of 10 October 2002, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=74&case=94&code=cn&p3=4>, accessed 10 February 2011 [302–03].

77 ibid 304. The Court ratified this approach in its judgment in Black Sea (n 67) 198.

78 Meron (n 10) 402.

79 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain). Merits, Judgment of 16 March 2001, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=61&case=87&code=qb&p3=4> accessed 7 February 2011, 81.

80 See ibid 182.

81 See ibid 167.

82 ibid 167.

83 ibid 214.

84 See ibid 215.

85 For a recent use of the arguendo technique in international adjudication, see WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand, United States—Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties (US – Customs Bond Directive) (16 July 2008) WT/DS343/AB/R, WT/DS345/AB/R, [310]–[19], available at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds345_e.htm>, accessed 9 February 2011.

86 See Maritime Delimitation Between Qatar and Bahrain, (n 79) 175.

87 ibid 176–77.

88 See ibid 180.

89 ibid 179.

90 ibid 181.

91 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 13 July 2009, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=37&case=133&code=coni&p3=4> accessed 16 March 2010 [134]. For a comment, see Bjorge, E, International Court of Justice, ‘Case Concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)’, Judgment of 13 July 2009, (2011) 60 ICLQ 271CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92 See Navigational Rights (n 91) 140.

93 See ibid.

94 See ibid 141.

95 ibid.

96 In its separate opinion, Judge Sepulveda-Amador opposed the Court's conclusion. He claimed that it was based neither on state practice nor on opinio juris. See Separate Opinion of Judge Sepulveda-Amador, 22–8.

97 For a comment on this conclusion, briefly highlighting the absence of opinio juris, see Weckel, P, ‘Chronique de Jurisprudence Internationale. Court Internationale de Justice. Arret du 13 juillet 2009. Differend Relatif a Des Droit de Navigation et des Droit Connexes (Costa Rica – Nicaragua)’, (2009) 113 Revue Général de Droit International Public 931, 928Google Scholar.

98 It cannot be claimed that the Court, in general, does not require proof of the opinio juris for the recognition of regional customary international law. This is a conclusion that could be made only on the basis of a steady case-law in this regard and not only on a single case.

99 See Navigational Rights (n 91) 143.

100 For a brief description of the facts of this dispute, see text to n 53.

101 See Arrest Warrant (n 53) 17.

102 See Joint Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 8.

103 As to the DRC's decision in this regard, see ibid 7. As to Belgium's position, see ibid 9.

104 See Arrest Warrant (n 53) 43, and Joint Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 12, 13 and 16.

105 See ibid 3. These judges assessed domestic laws and rulings as evidence of State practice, and international treaties. See ibid 20–43. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume, 1.

106 See ibid.

107 According to Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, national legislation and case-law is neutral as to universal jurisdiction. There is neither a customary rule regarding universal jurisdiction nor an opinio juris considering it unlawful. See Joint Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, 45. However, these judges supported the view that there was a trend toward allowing States to punish crimes against humanity. See ibid 52. For his part, Judge Guillaume was of the view that there was no customary or conventional international rule regarding universal jurisdiction. See Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume, 12. In his view, universal jurisdiction would promote judicial chaos and favor only powerful States. See ibid 15.

108 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, 12.

109 R Fabri and Sorel, (n 53) 863.

110 See Armed Activities (n 37) 226.

111 See ibid 244.

112 See ibid 246, 248.

113 See Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, 11.

114 Scholars commenting on this judgment have not understood the Resolutions as having been declared as customary international law. See, for instance, Weckel, P and Areou, G, ‘Chronique de Jurisprudence Internationale’, (2006) 110 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 173, 183Google Scholar; Dufresne, R, ‘Reflections and Extrapolation on the ICJ's Approach to Illegal Resource Exploitation in the Armed Activities Case’, (2007–2008) 40 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 171, 215–16Google Scholar; Okowa, PN, ‘Current Developments: Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)’, (2006) 55 ICLQ 742, 751CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and F Latty, ‘La Cour Internationale de Justice Face aux Tiraillements du Droit International: Les Arrêt dans Les Affaires des Activités Armées sur le Territoire du Congo (RDC c. Ouganda, 19 Décembre 2005; RDC c. Rwanda, 3 Février, 2006)’, (2006) LI Annuaire Français de Droit International 205, 232.

115 Resolution 1803 was adopted by 87 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions. The United States supported the resolution, France and South Africa were against it, and the countries under the influence of the Soviet Union and Ghana and Burma abstained. See S Schwebel, ‘The Story of the United Nations Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, in S Schwebel (ed) Justice in International Law: Selected Writings (CUP, Cambridge, 1994) 24.

116 See Texaco v Libya, Award on the Merits of 10 October 1977, 53 ILR 389 and Kuwait v Aminoil, Award of 24 March, 143. See, generally, S Ripinsky & K Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (BIICL, London, 2008) 72–4.

117 UN General Assembly Resolution 1803(XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/resources.htm> accessed 12 February 2011. For instance, the notion of appropriate compensation has been hotly debated by capital-exporting countries, which are always in favour of full compensation as the standard in this regard. This is the standard that has almost always been included in bilateral investment treaties. See Schwebel (n 115) 244.

118 See Schachter (n 27) 535.

119 See, generally, Ripinsky and Williams (n 116) 73.

120 See International Committee of the Red Cross, JM Henckaerts & L Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol 1 (CUP, Cambridge, 2005) xxxiv.

121 See Statute of the International Law Commission, available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute_e.pdf>, accessed 8 February 2011.

122 This is not to say that there has not been any relevant State practice supporting the existence or non-existence of the customary rule, but to argue that part of the grounds for the decision by the Court has been its own prior judgments or other tribunals' decisions. Of course international judicial decisions also play a role in the identification of customary international law applicable in domestic litigation in some national legal systems. See, for instance, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Ken Wiwa, et. Al v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. et al., Order 28 April 2009, at 10.

123 See text n 83, n 84 and n 90.

124 However, this is not to say that regional customary international law has a lesser binding status than general customary international law, since several authors and the ILC have argued that the former could be seen as having an informal higher hierarchy than the latter due to the principle of lex specialis. See International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, finalized by M Koskenniemi, Fifty-eight session, (13 April 2006), available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G06/610/77/PDF/G0661077.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 10 February 2011, 85.

125 See International Court of Justice, Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru), Judgment of 20 November 1950, available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=f8&case=7&code=cp&p3=4>, accessed 7 February 2011, 277–8.

126 See text to n 95.