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Open international markets without exclusion: encompassing domestic political institutions, international organization, and self-contained regimes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 June 2011

William Phelan
William Phelan*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
*
E-mail: phelanw@tcd.ie
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Abstract

The politics of open international markets are frequently characterized as a Prisoners’ Dilemma, where states’ incentives to adopt protectionist policies are restrained by trading partners’ threat or use of retaliatory exclusion mechanisms. However, because Ricardian theories of comparative advantage suggest that unilateral trade openness enhances aggregate welfare, states whose domestic political institutions are encompassing – where the policymaker is responsive to a large proportion of the population and can authoritatively coordinate policy across diverse issues – have incentives to support open international markets without the threat or use of retaliatory mechanisms by other states. This explanation for the existence of an open international market has implications for theoretical and empirical research in international organization, as well as for discussions on the possibility of ‘self-contained regimes’ in international legal scholarship.

Keywords

reciprocityretaliationinternational organizationinternational lawdomestic institutions
Type
Original Papers
Information
International Theory , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , 20 June 2011 , pp. 286 - 306
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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