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Innovation and Preservation: Remaking China's National Leadership Training System*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2011

Gregory T. Chin
Gregory T. Chin
Affiliation:
York University. Email: gtchin@yorku.ca
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Abstract

This article details the reorganization of China's national leadership training system, and analyses the reforms as an integral element of the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to adapt institutionally to a rapidly changing environment. Three main findings are presented. First, the national leadership training system is being remade under the direction of the Party's Central Organization Department to give greater emphasis to the “spirit of reform and innovation,” as seen especially in the creation of the China Executive Leadership Academy in Pudong, Shanghai, and in the formation of sister academies in Jinggangshan and Yan'an. Second, China's political elite have given greater priority to leadership innovation, although they are trying to balance this with ensuring that sufficient attention and resources are also given to preserving the ruling status of the CCP. Third, by establishing the new group of training academies under the COD, the Party is diversifying beyond the Party School system for leadership research and training. The article suggests that the guiding logic behind these reforms is to promote enough innovation in managerial training and research to enable the Party to meet the changing governance requirements of the market transition and economic globalization, while at the same time putting in place institutional measures that help to preserve the Party's rule.

Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 205 , March 2011 , pp. 18 - 39
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2011

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References

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6 Data and information in this article derive primarily from discussions and field interviews with senior representatives, teachers and trainees at the main training academies of the national leadership training system (including the CPS and local Party Schools, CNSA, CELAP and CELAJ) from October 2002 to June 2008. The research was initially conducted by the author as a representative of the Canadian Embassy in Beijing, and later in an academic capacity.

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32 Pieke, “Market Leninism,” p. 9.

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40 Italics added.

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42 Interview, Shanghai, March 2005. CELAP officials emphasize that it is a “Shanghai-based national institution that is funded by the central government,” meaning that its core funding comes from the State budget, specifically the portion allotted to the COD. The initial investment for the construction of the Pudong Academy was covered by the Shanghai municipal government, particularly the land and building. Construction cost was reportedly 800 million yuan (approximately US$100 million). Ongoing operational costs are covered by the COD. CELAP does provide some contracted training in accordance with the “market way,” with provinces and foreign companies being the main clients.

43 CELAP also offers MBA and MPA training “according to market demand,” as well as specialized training programmes based on requests from political parties, government offices, enterprises and social organizations.

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48 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point.

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50 Interview with CELAP officials, Shanghai, March 2005.

51 This policy research project was partially funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (2005–07).

52 Interview with CELAP officials, Shanghai, March 2005.

53 Ibid.

54 CELAP website, “Exchanges and cooperation: to companies and agencies,” http://61.129.65.35/renda/node3284/node3288/userobject1ai35957.html.

55 Ibid.

56 CELAP website, “Forum participants: leadership forum,” http://61.129.65.35/renda/node3284/node3294/userobject1ai35999.html.

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66 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this point of interpretation.

67 I thank Charlotte Lee for this point. Private correspondence.

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81 Recent studies include Shambaugh, David L., “China's propaganda system: institutions, processes, and efficacy,” The China Journal, No. 57 (2007), pp. 25–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shambaugh, David L., “Training China's political elite: the Party School system,” The China Quarterly, No. 196 (2008), pp. 827–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dickson, Bruce, Wealth into Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walder, Andrew G., “The Party elite and China's trajectory of change,” China: An International Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2004), pp. 189–209Google Scholar; Dickson, Red Capitalists in China.