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Self-deception is adaptive in itself

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Louisa C. Egan
Affiliation:
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208. louisa-egan@kellogg.northwestern.eduhttp://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/directory/egan_louisa.aspx

Abstract

Von Hippel & Trivers reason that the potential benefits of successfully deceiving others provide a basis for the evolution of self-deception. However, as self-deceptive processes themselves provide considerable adaptive value to an individual, self-deception may have evolved as an end in itself, rather than as the means to an end of improving other-deception.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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