World Politics

Research Article

Gonna Party Like It's 1899: Party Systems and the Origins of Varieties of Coordination

Cathie Jo Martina1 and Duane Swanka2*

a1 Boston University, Email: cjmartin@bu.edu

a2 Marquette University, Email: duane.swank@marquette.edu

Abstract

This article explores the origins of peak employers' associations to understand why countries produce highly centralized macrocorporatist groups, weaker national associations but stronger industry-level groups, or highly fragmented pluralist associations. The authors suggest that the structure of partisan competition played a vital causal role in the development and evolution of these peak associations. The leadership for peak employers' association development came from business-oriented party activists and bureaucrats, who sought both to advance industrial development policy and to solve specific problems of political control. Business-oriented party leaders and bureaucrats in both predemocratic and democratic regimes feared the rising tide of democracy and labor activism and viewed employer organization as a useful tool for political control, to secure parliamentary advantage, and to serve as a societal counterweight to working class activism. Because leadership for association building came from the state, the political rules of the game were crucial to outcomes. The structure of party competition and state centralization shaped incentives for strategic coordination for both political actors and employers. Dedicated business parties were more likely to develop in countries with multiparty systems and limited federal power sharing than in countries with two-party systems and federalism: in a multiparty context where no single party was likely to gain power, each party had an incentive to cooperate with other social groups. Moreover, business-oriented party leaders and bureaucrats in multiparty systems were motivated to delegate policy-making authority to coordinated societal channels for industrial relations, because they anticipated that employers would win more in these channels than in parliamentary settings where the center and left could form a coalition against the right. Again, centralized party systems were more likely than federal ones to develop a dedicated national business party that transcended regional cleavages and to retain a strong role for the state in the governance of industrial relations.

(Online publication February 10 2011)

Cathie Jo Martin is a professor of political science at Boston University and chair of the Council for European Studies. She is the author of Stuck in Neutral: Business and the Politics of Human Capital Investment Policy (2000), Shifting the Burden: The Struggle over Growth and Corporate Taxation (1991), and Aktivering af arbejdsgiverne: Arbejdsmarkedets svage i Danmark og Storbritannien [Activating Employers] (2004). Her articles have appeared in major American and European political science journals.

Duane Swank is a professor of political science at Marquette University. He is the author of Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States (2002). He is currently finishing a book with Cathie Jo Martin on the origins, evolution, and policy impacts of employers' organizations in democratic capitalist political economies.

* The authors wish to thank the following institutions and individuals for their support for and insights into this project: the Radcliffe Institute, the Helen Way Klingler College of Arts and Sciences at Marquette University, the Danish Social Science Research Council, the Institute of Advanced Study at Warwick University, the Erhvervsarkivet (Aarhus Denmark), the Modern Records Centre (Warwick, University), Baker Library (Harvard Business School), the National Archives of Scotland, Patrick Bernhagen, Marius Busemeyer, Giovanni Capoccia, Peter Munk Christiansen, Samantha Fang, Jeffrey Fear, Wyn Grant, Jørgen Fink, Alex Hicks, Torben Iversen, Geoffrey Jones, Tim Knudsen, Morten Larsen, Peter Lohmann, Rodney Lowe, Jim Milkey, Gerhard Ritter, Neil Rollings, David Soskice, Kathleen Thelen, and participants at seminars series at Aarhus University, University of Aberdeen, Boston University, Copenhagen Business School, Duke University, Harvard Business School, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard Center for European Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Notre Dame, Oxford University, Southern Danish University, the University of Warwick, and the Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin.