The Review of Symbolic Logic

Research Article

ON TRUTH-FUNCTIONALITY

DANIEL J. HILLa1 c1 and STEPHEN K. McLEODa1 c1

a1 University of Liverpool

Abstract

Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is immune from the counterexamples that Schnieder proposes and is preferable to Schnieder’s alternative.

(Received May 01 2009)

Correspondence:

c1 DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL, 7 ABERCROMBY SQUARE, LIVERPOOL L69 7WY, UNITED KINGDOM. E-mail: djhill@liv.ac.uk, skmcleod@liv.ac.uk