10 On the logic of US nuclear war planning in implicit or explicit historical context, see, in addition to Sagan, ‘SIOP-62’; Rosenberg, David Alan, ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960’, International Security, 7 (1983), pp. 3–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar
; Postol, Theodore A., ‘Targeting’, in Carter, Ashton B., Steinbruner, John D., Zraket, Charles Z. (eds), Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 373–406Google Scholar
; Steinbruner, John D., ‘Choices and Trade-offs’, in Carter, et al. , Managing Nuclear Operations, pp. 535–554Google Scholar
; Trachtenberg, Marc, ‘A “Wasting Asset”: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954’, International Security, 13 (1988/1989), pp. 5–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar
; Sagan, Scott D., Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 10–57Google Scholar
; Nolan, Janne E., Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 1989)Google Scholar
; Blair, Bruce G., The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993)Google Scholar
, which is, however, about more than accident; see esp. chap. 3, pp. 38–58; William Burr, ‘“To Have the Only Option That of Killing 80 Million People is the Height of Immorality”, The Nixon Administration, the SIOP, and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1974’, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 173 (23 November 2005), {http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/index.htm}. On consequential but opaque military assumptions, see Eden, Lynn, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004)Google Scholar
.
