Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 33 / Issue 04 / August 2010, pp 339-340
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010
- DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10001767 (About DOI), Published online: 22 October 2010
Open Peer Commentary
Person as lawyer: How having a guilty mind explains attributions of intentional agency
Frank Hindriksa1
a1 Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, 9712 GL Groningen, The Netherlands. f.a.hindriks@rug.nl http://www.rug.nl/staff/f.a.hindriks/index
Abstract
In criminal law, foresight betrays a guilty mind as much as intent does: both reveal that the agent is not properly motivated to avoid an illegal state of affairs. This commonality warrants our judgment that the state is brought about intentionally, even when unintended. In contrast to Knobe, I thus retain the idea that acting intentionally is acting with a certain frame of mind.
Related Articles
- Person as scientist, person as moralist
