a1 Department of Arts and Design, University IUAV of Venice, 30123 Venice, Italy, and Laboratory of Cognitive Psychology, CNRS and University of Provence, 13003 Marseilles, France. firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.iuav.it/Ricerca1/Dipartimen/dADI/Docenti/girotto-vi/index.htm
a2 Department of Cognitive Sciences and Education, Center for Mind/Brain Sciences. University of Trento, 38068 Rovereto (TN), Italy. email@example.com http://portale.unitn.it/cimec/persone/luca.surian
We have found that moral considerations interact with belief ascription in determining intentionality judgment. We attribute this finding to a differential availability of plausible counterfactual alternatives that undo the negative side-effect of an action. We conclude that Knobe's thesis does not account for processes by which counterfactuals are generated and how these processes affect moral evaluations.