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Evidence of coordination as a cure for concept eliminativism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Andrea Scarantino
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302. ascarantino@gsu.edu

Abstract

I argue that Machery stacks the deck against hybrid theories of concepts by relying on an unduly restrictive understanding of coordination between concept parts. Once a less restrictive notion of coordination is introduced, the empirical case for hybrid theories of concepts becomes stronger, and the appeal of concept eliminativism weaker.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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