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The function and representation of concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Sangeet S. Khemlani
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540. khemlani@princeton.eduhttp://www.princeton.edu/~khemlani
Geoffrey Goodwin
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. ggoodwin@psych.upenn.eduhttp://www.psych.upenn.edu/people/ggoodwin

Abstract

Machery has usefully organized the vast heterogeneity in conceptual representation. However, we believe his argument is too narrow in tacitly assuming that concepts are comprised of only prototypes, exemplars, and theories, and also that its eliminative aspect is too strong. We examine two exceptions to Machery's representational taxonomy before considering whether doing without concepts is a good idea.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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