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Two uneliminated uses for “concepts”: Hybrids and guides for inquiry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Chad Gonnerman  and
Jonathan M. Weinberg
Chad Gonnerman
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. cgonnerm@indiana.edujmweinbe@indiana.eduhttp://www.indiana.edu/~eel
Jonathan M. Weinberg
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. cgonnerm@indiana.edujmweinbe@indiana.eduhttp://www.indiana.edu/~eel
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Abstract

Machery's case against hybrids rests on a principle that is too strong, even by his own lights. And there are likely important generalizations to be made about hybrids, if they do exist. Moreover, even if there were no important generalizations about concepts themselves, the term picks out an important class of entities and should be retained to help guide inquiry.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 211 - 212
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Braisby, N. (2005) Similarity and categorisation: Getting dissociations in perspective. In: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Cognitive Science Society, ed. Forbus, K., Getner, D. & Regier, T., pp. 150–55. Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Elder, C. L. (1994) Higher and lower essential natures. American Philosophical Quarterly 31:255–65.Google Scholar
Machery, E. (2009) Doing without concepts. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar