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After Neoliberalism: The Politics of Reregulation in Mexico

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Richard Snyder
Richard Snyder
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
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Abstract

Neoliberal economic reforms, rather than unleashing market forces, can result in new institutions for market governance. By vacating institutionalized policy domains, neoliberal reforms can trigger two-step reregulation processes, as first, political entrepreneurs launch projects to build support coalitions by reregulating markets, and second, societal groups respond to these projects by mobilizing to influence the terms of reregulation. Depending on the strengths and strategies of politicians and societal groups, reregulation processes result in varied institutions for market governance. The article develops this argument by analyzing how neoliberal reforms in Mexico led to the construction of distinct institutions for market governance across four states (Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Puebla). The findings from Mexico highlight the importance of moving beyond the questions of why developing countries choose neoliberal policies and how they implement them. Students of the political economy of development should shift their attention instead to understanding the kinds of new institutions that replace those destroyed or displaced by neoliberal reforms.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 51 , Issue 2 , January 1999 , pp. 173 - 204
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1999

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References

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27 See Richard Snyder, “After the State Withdraws: Neoliberalism and Subnational Authoritarian Regimes in Mexico,” in Wayne A. Cornelius et al., eds., Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, forthcoming).

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45 See Richard Snyder, “Reconstructing Institutions for Market Governance: Participatory Policy Regimes in Mexico's Coffee Sector,” in Richard Snyder, ed., Institutional Adaptation and Innovation in Rural Mexico (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, forthcoming).

46 Attempting to defeat the crony capitalist project would have been extremely costly for the small producers, given the state government's coercive capacities and demonstrated willingness to repress peasants. On state government repression in Chiapas, see Harvey (fn. 41).

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