a1 Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE-405 30, Göteborg, Sweden. Email: Hakan.Eggert@economics.gu.se
a2 Department of Economics, University of Dar es Salaam, Box 35045, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Email: email@example.com
This paper analyzes the causes for regulatory compliance, using traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. We use self-reported data from 459 Tanzanian artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria. The results indicate that the decision to be either a non-violator or a violator, as well as the violation rate – if the latter – are influenced by changes in deterrence variables like the probability of detection and punishment and also by legitimacy and social variables. We also identify a small group of fishers who react neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables but persistently violate the regulation.
(Received August 30 2007)
(Revised March 13 2009)
(Revised June 11 2009)
(Accepted September 05 2009)
(Online publication November 13 2009)