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Evolution, learning, games, and simple heuristics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2001

Peter Hammerstein
Affiliation:
Innovationskolleg Theoretische Biologie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 12247 Berlin, Germanyp.hammerstein@itb.biologie.hu-berlin.de

Abstract

Humans are incapable of acting as utility maximisers. In contrast, the evolutionary process had considerable time and computational power to select optimal heuristics from a set of alternatives. To view evolution as the optimising agent has revolutionised game theory. Gigerenzer and his co-workers can help us understand the circumstances under which evolution and learning achieve optimisation and Nash equilibria.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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