Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-sxzjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-18T15:20:16.894Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Searle Rediscovers What Was Not Lost*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Tim Kenyon
Tim Kenyon
Affiliation:
The University of Western Ontario
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind comprises two related projects. The first is to show that philosophy of mind since Descartes has been not merely false, but obviously false. The materialist tradition—as Searle encapsulates behaviourism, type and token identity theories, functionalism, Artificial Intelligence, and eliminativism—consists of more or less crazy positions, with a crucial shared trait: they “leave out” the mind, the very thing they were to explain. Searle's second concern is to sketch his own theory of mind, a “common-sense” view that is, he claims, obviously true, and thus is a sharp departure from the madness of the various received views of this century.

Type
Critical Notices/Études critiques
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , Winter 1998 , pp. 117 - 130
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Churchland, Paul 1988 Matter and Consciousness. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dennett, Daniel C. 1993 “Review of The Rediscovery of the Mind.” The Journal of Philosophy, 90, 4 (April): 193–205.Google Scholar
Flanagan, Owen 1988 The Science of the Mind. 4th ed. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981 Representations. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, Jerry A. 1985 “Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation.” Mind, 94: 76–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fodor, Jerry A. 1987 Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Explorations in Cognitive Science, No. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, Jaegwin 1995 “Mental Causation in Searle's ‘Biological Naturalism.’” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 1 (March): 189–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loar, Brian 1990 “Phenomenal States.” In Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Edited by Tombelin, J.. Atascodera: Ridgeview, pp. 81–108.Google Scholar
Place, U. T. 1988 “Thirty Years On—Is Consciousness Still a Brain Process?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66, 2: 208–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Searle, John R. 1995 “Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: A Reply.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 1 (March): 217–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar