a1 Cornell University
My main topic will be, roughly speaking, the claim that mental events or conscious experiences or inner experiences are brain processes. I hasten to say, however, that I am not going to talk about “mental events” or “conscious experiences” or “inner experiences.” These expressions are almost exclusively philosophers terms, and I am not sure that I have got the hang of any of them. Philosophers are not in agreement in their use of these terms. One philosopher will say, for example, that a pain in the foot is a mental event, whereas another will say that a pain in the foot certainly is not a mental event.
1 This paper was read at the Sixtieth Annua Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. It is a reply to Professor J.J.C. Smart's essay, “Materialism”, published in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LX, No. 22: October, 1963.