Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2009 - Volume 32, Issue 06  

Cambridge Journals Online - CUP Full-Text Page
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:528-528 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09991294

Open Peer Commentary

Are beliefs the proper targets of adaptationist analyses?

James R. Liddlea1 and Todd K. Shackelforda1

a1 Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic University, Davie, FL 33314. jliddle1@fau.edu http://www.jamesrliddle.com tshackel@fau.edu http://www.toddkshackelford.com
Article author query
liddle jr [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
shackelford tk [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) description of beliefs, and misbeliefs in particular, is a commendable contribution to the literature; but we argue that referring to beliefs as adaptive or maladaptive can cause conceptual confusion. “Adaptive” is inconsistently defined in the article, which adds to confusion and renders it difficult to evaluate the claims, particularly the possibility of “adaptive misbelief.”

The evolution of misbelief Ryan T. McKay and Daniel C. Dennett Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich 8006, Switzerland; and Centre for Anthropology and Mind, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6PE, United Kingdom ryantmckay@mac.com http://homepage.mac.com/ryantmckay/; The Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155-7059 ddennett@tufts.edu http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/incbios/dennettd/dennettd.htm