Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-wq2xx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T03:00:02.283Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Organizations and economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2010

RICHARD ADELSTEIN*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT 06459, United States

Abstract:

Judge Posner (2010) identifies organizational economics with the principal-agent problem and offers no definition of the crucial term organization, which leads him to force the principal-agent template on social formations that are not organizations and to neglect aspects of their operation that might be illuminated by alternative conceptions of organizational economics. This response offers an explicit characterization of organizations as central planning agencies, considers Posner's examples in light of the problems of purpose, information, and control faced by all central planners, and draws upon an emerging capabilities theory of organizations to extend the scope of Posner's analysis and suggest insights beyond those that flow from the principal-agent approach.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adelstein, Richard (2005), ‘Knowledge and power in the mechanical firm: planning for profit in Austrian perspective’, Review of Austrian Economics, 18: 5582.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coase, Ronald H. (1937), ‘The nature of the firm’, Economica, 4: 386405.Google Scholar
Hayek, Friedrich A. (1937), ‘Economics and knowledge’, Economica, 4: 3354.Google Scholar
Langlois, Richard N. and Foss, Nicolai J. (1999), ‘Capabilities and governance: the rebirth of production in the theory of economic organization’, Kyklos, 52: 201218.Google Scholar
Posner, Richard A. (2010), ‘From the new institutional economics to organization economics: with applications to corporate governance, government agencies, and legal institutions’, Journal of Institutional Economics, 6 (1): 137.Google Scholar