Critical Notices/Études critiques

McGinn's Cognitive Closure*

Philip P. Hansona1

a1 Simon Fraser University

Can we succeed in giving consciousness a naturalistic explanation, that is, an explanation in “broadly physical terms” (p. 23)? This is the “problem of consciousness” which, along with other aspects of the mind-body problem, is explored by McGinn in a collection of eight independently written but related, sometimes overlapping papers, all but two previously published. The papers span a decade and divergent approaches. The resulting juxtaposition of two contrasting “resolutions” of the problem by the same author invites their comparison.


* Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), vii + 216 pp. Page references are to this work. [OpenURL Query Data]  [Google Scholar]