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Imagery in the UK: Britain's troubled imagery intelligence architecture

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2009

PHILIP H. J. DAVIES
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Abstract

This article examines the status, role and development of imagery intelligence in the UK government. It is argued that imagery intelligence occupies a subordinate and marginalised position compared to other forms of intelligence, chiefly from human sources and the interception of communications. The origins of that position are recounted, and the problems arising from internal struggles over control of imagery examined. It is concluded that the existing approach to imagery represents a serious problem and that a substantial restructuring and upgrading of imagery intelligence is essential if UK foreign policy decision-making is to be properly informed in the 21st Century.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , October 2009 , pp. 957 - 969
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2009

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References

1 A number of US commentators have looked on the British system with something akin to envy because of the strife-prone history of their own intelligence community. See, for example, the report of the Aspin-Brown commission Harold Brown, Warren Rudman et al, ‘Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence’, ‘The Need for Policy Guidance’, downloadable {http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int007.html}, accessed on 27 November 2007.

2 For the accepted accounts see, for example, Cabinet Office Central Intelligence Machinery (London: HMSO, 1993) passim; Michael Herman ‘Assessment Machinery: British and American Models’ Intelligence & National Security, 10:4 (1995), pp. 21–31.

3 Oddly enough, the MI5-MI6 rivalry has appeared most recently in Crispin Black, 7-7: What Went Wrong? (London: Gobson Square, 2005), pp.41–2, which is surprising given Black's substantial intelligence community experience.

4 Philip H. J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Taylor & Francis, 2004), pp. 275–78.

5 On JTAC see, for example, Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2003–2004 (London: TSO, 2003), pp. 27–8. Far less remarked is JNAC which is actually a combined US-UK enterprise, see for example, House of Commons Daily Hansard Written Answers for 28 November 2006 Column 624W.

6 In recent years, a fourth discipline, Measurements and Signatures Intelligence has often been included but this is less a single discipline than a catch-all for a range of techniques not covered in the HUMINT-SIGINT-IMINT triad; see Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘MASINT: the New Kid In Town’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 14:2 (2001). A nominal fifth discipline is the use of open sources (OSINT), but the inclusion of open sources as intelligence as opposed to being supporting information is far from universally accepted.

7 By some estimates, SIGINT contributes ‘80% of all raw intelligence collected’, see, for example, W. Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1985), p. 31.

8 On multispectral sensing see, for example, William E. Burrows, Deep Black: The Startling Truth Behind America's Top-Secret Spy Satellites (New York: Berkely Books, 1988), pp. 224–5, 260–3; G. J. Oxlee, Aerospace Reconnaissance (London: Brassey's, 1997), pp. 89–104, 130.

9 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power and Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 73.

10 M.Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), p. 73.

11 See, for example, D. Albright, P. Brannan and J. Shire, ‘ISIS Report: Can Military Strikes Destroy Iran's Gas Centrifuge Program? Probably Not.’ (Washington DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2008).

12 See, for example, ‘The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMW Commission)’, Report to the President, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005), pp. 164–5.

13 Private information. See also National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Media Release 04-14, NGA Assisting U.S. Agencies in Tsunami Disaster Assessment, 19 December 2004.

14 This is along with closely related activities such as local physical and audiovisual surveillance.

15 In British parlance this refers to the distinction between different aspects of Royal Prerogative, specifically domestic governance under the authority of the Home Office and foreign relations under that of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

16 Private information.

17 Herman Intelligence Agencies in an Information Age (London: Frank Cass, 2001) p. 84, emphasis added.

18 Ibid., p. 191.

19 See, for example, the JAGO website at: {http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/aboutdefence/whatwedo/securityandintelligence/dis/icg/jointaeronauticalandgeospatialorganisation.htm} accessed on 21 October 2008.

20 The JARIC website is at: {http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/SecurityandIntelligence/DIS/ICG/JaricTheNationalImageryExploitationCentre.htm} accessed on 21 October 2008. and DGC at: {http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/SecurityandIntelligence/DIS/ICG/DefenceGeographicCentre.htm} accessed on 21 October 2008.

21 UK Select Committee on Defence Fifth Report: The Defence Geographic and Imagery Intelligence Agency HC100 (London: TSO, 1999), para. 2.

22 Ministry of Defence, ‘Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence: JARIC and Military Survey and their Proposed Merger’, appended to House of Commons Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth Special Report HC930 (London: HMSO, 2000).

23 ‘Charter for the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (United Kingdom)’ but foliated with a covering note from J. D. Orme, 17 December 1953, AIR 2/12744.

24 Ministry of Defence, ‘Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence: JARIC and Military Survey and their Proposed Merger’, appended to House of Commons Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth Special Report HC930 (London: HMSO, 2000).

25 Group Captain Stephen Lloyd, Evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, 8 December 1999, question 119; downloadable http at: {http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/100/9120801.htm} accessed on 21 October 2008.

26 See, for example, the charters issued to JARIC in April 1952, July 1952, and December 1953 in AIR 2/12744.

27 Strictly speaking, TALENT-KEYHOLE is a codeword designating a level and type of access to a particular intelligence product, in this case overhead reconnaissance; however, individual collection systems such as CORONA or ARGUS will have Keyhole or ‘KH’ numbers as well as platform-specific ‘Byeman’ code names and serial numbers; Burrows Deep Black pp. 20–1. In the UK ‘TK clearance’ is considered a vetting grade above the Developed Vetting standard required for constant and regular access to top secret codeword materials.

28 Lloyd, ‘Evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence’, questions 56 and 57; although Lloyd's replies are redacted, the language of the successive questions posed by the Committee indicate much of what Lloyd confirms about the practice. See also Michael Smith, New Cloak Old Dagger: How Britain's Spies Came in From the Cold (London: Gollancz, 1996), p. 199.

29 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), p. 86.

30 UK Select Committee on Defence Fifth Report: The Defence Geographic and Imagery Intelligence Agency Session 1999–2000, HC 100, fn.48, downloaded http from: {http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/cmdfence.htm} accessed on 2 February 2007.

31 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p. 289–90.

32 Denis Capell-Dunn, ‘The Intelligence Machine’, 10 January 1945, p. 10, CAB 163/6, TNA, hereafter referred to as ‘The Intelligence Machine’.

33 Capell-Dunn, ‘The Intelligence Machine’, pp. 10, 18.

34 Air Chief Marshall H. P. Lloyd to J. S. Orme, Undersecretary of the Air Ministry, 22 May 1952, AIR 2/12744.

35 H. P. Lloyd to J. S. Orme, 22 May, ibid.

36 The PR9 would remain in service as a UK imagery platform until 2006, by which time UAVs were moving into the prevalent air-breathing tactical reconnaissance and mapping role occupied by the PR9s at the end of their operational livelihood.

37 Douglas Evill, ‘Review of Intelligence Organisations, 1947: Report by Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill’, Misc/P(47)31, 6 November 1947, p.2, CAB 163/7, p. 23.

38 ‘Control of JAPIC(UK)’, 19 May 1952, AIR 2/12744.

39 J. S. Orme to Commander in Chief, Bomber Command, 16 April 1952, ibid. Emphasis added.

40 H. P. Lloyd to J. S. Orme, 22 May 1952, ibid.

41 ‘Charter for the Joint Air Photographic Interpretation Centre (United Kingdom)’ no date, but foliated with a covering note from J. D. Orme, 30 July 1952, AIR 2/12744. Emphasis added.

42 J. D. Orme to H.P. Lloyd, 20 July 1952, AIR 2/1274.

43 ‘Charter for the Joint Air Photographic Interpretation Centre (United Kingdom)’ no date, but foliated with a covering note from J. D. Orme, 30 July 1952, AIR 2/12744.

44 Ibid., 17 December 1953, AIR 2/12744.

45 M. H. O'Grady, 25 February 1954; J. M. Freeman, 9 December 1955, AIR 2/12744.

46 M. McF. Davis, 3 November 1955, AIR 2/12744.

47 Group Captain J.M Freeman, ‘JARIC(UK) Photographic Section’, 11 November 1955, AIR 2/12744

48 Joint Intelligence Secretariat, ‘History of the Joint Intelligence Organisation’ JIC/1/56, 31 December 1955, CAB 163/8.

49 Imagery is notable chiefly by its absence in the papers detailing the Trend reforms in CAB 163/124.

50 Air Commodore S. C. Widdows, Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) to C in C Bomber Command ‘Central Reconnaissance Establishment’, 12 February 1956 AIR 29/3310.

51 ‘Charter for the Central Reconnaissance Establishment and the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre’, 16 November 1962 AIR 2/12744.

52 ‘Proposed Reconnaissance Staff Establishment for the Control of UK Reconnaissance Forces on the Disbandment of CRE’, CRE/S553/4/Org, no date, but foliated with covering note from K. C. Giddings, CRE, to OC JARIC Group Captain J. S. Hart, 25 January 1968, AIR 14/4103.

53 ‘The Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (United Kingdom) JARIC(UK)’ DS16/JSE/6 July 1970; Group Captain J. S. Hart OC JARIC ‘JARIC(UK) – Revised Organisation’ JAR/S1/Air, 4 November 1969, AIR 14/4103.

54 Private information.

55 Quoted in UK Select Committee on Defence Fifth Report para. 13.

56 UK Select Committee on Defence Fifth Report para. 13.

57 ICHR. Lloyd Evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, q.2.

58 Ministry of Defence, ‘Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence: JARIC and Military Survey and their Proposed Merger’.

59 ISC Annual Report 1999–2000 paras. 24–25.

60 Private information.

61 Cabinet Office, ‘Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee's Annual Report 1999–2000’, CM 5013.

62 The previous such restructuring had been in December 2005; Defence Intelligence Staff, The Defence Intelligence Staff downloaded pdf from {www.mod.gov.uk} accessed on 10 January 2006, p.8; Ministry of Defence, ‘About Defence: Defence Intelligence’, downloaded http: {http://www.mod.uk/NR/exeres/DEA75B45-FFCF-411C-8F86-E0EEAF023BB7.htm} accessed on 4 May 2007.