Religious Studies

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Richard Swinburne's argument to the simplicity of God via the infinite

JEREMY GWIAZDAa1 c1

a1 Department of Philosophy, The Graduate Center, The City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016

Abstract

In The Coherence of Theism Richard Swinburne writes that a person cannot be omniscient and perfectly free. In The Existence of God Swinburne writes that God is a person who is omniscient and perfectly free. There is a straightforward reason why the two passages are not in tension, but recognition of this reason raises a problem for Swinburne's argument in The Existence of God (the conclusion of which is that God likely exists). In this paper I present the problem for Swinburne's argument. I then consider two potential responses and suggest that neither succeeds.

Correspondence:

c1 e-mail: jgwiazda@gc.cuny.edu