^{page 162 note 1} Watson, J. B. and McDougall, W., The Battle of Behaviourism (Psyche Miniatures General Series) p. 13.Google Scholar

^{page 170 note 1} See Dilman, and Phillips, , Sense and Delusion (Routledge, 1971) pp. 82–4.Google Scholar

^{page 173 note 1} Merton, Thomas, No Man is an Island (Dell paperback) p. 108.Google Scholar

^{page 173 note 2} Purity of Heart, trans, by Douglas Streere (Fontana paperback) p. 89.Google Scholar

^{page 173 note 3} Can one say the same of a political life dedicated to serving the people of one's country? Here Plato disagreed with Socrates. I owe this point to Dr Hugh Price.

^{page 175 note 1} ‘God in Plato’, in On Science, Necessity and the Love of God, trans, and ed. Rees, Richard (OUP) p. 101.Google Scholar

^{page 177 note 1} The Sovereignty of the Good (Routledge, 1970).Google Scholar

^{page 180 note 1} ‘Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics’, Philosophical Review, LXXIV, No. 1 (1965) p. 21.Google Scholar

^{page 181 note 1} Not in the Tractatus, but certainly in the Notebooks 1914–16.

^{page 181 note 2} I do not have the space to discuss what these come to, except to say that in this context ‘true’ characterises a measure. Socrates at the end of the Gorgias: ‘What I am going to tell you, I tell you as the truth’. The reference is to the story of the judgment day and Socrates' claim is that he cannot fill anything else with personal content. As for the distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘opinion’, it refers to whether or not a person has made his own the values which he has learnt or accepted. Plato would have said that knowledge begins only where moral instruction ends.

^{page 183 note 1} I owe this point to Professor Peter Winch. See his paper ‘Ethical Reward and Punishment’, in his book Ethics and Action (Routledge, 1972).Google Scholar

^{page 184 note 1} ‘On ne peut pas vouloir la croix’: ‘La Croix’, in La Pesanteur et la Grâce, p. 93.Google Scholar

^{page 184 note 2} ‘Spiritual Autobiography’, Waiting on God, trans, by Craufurd, Emma (Fontana Books, 1959) p. 49.Google Scholar

^{page 184 note 3} ‘Punishment is solely [i.e. ought to be] a method of procuring pure good for men who do not desire it. The art of punishing is the art of awakening in a criminal, by pain or even death, the desire for pure good’ — Weil, Simone, ‘Human Personality’, Selected Essays 1934–1943, trans. Rees, Richard (OUP, 1962) p. 31.Google Scholar She adds that this requires ‘the spirit of truth, justice and love’ in those who administer it, as well as in everyone else who is connected with the working of the institution.

^{page 185 note 1} Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Barrett, Cyril (Blackwell, 1966) p. 56.Google Scholar

^{page 187 note 1} Philosophical Review, LXXIV (1965) p. 6.Google Scholar

^{page 187 note 2} An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (The Liberal Arts Press, 1957) p. 111.Google Scholar

^{page 187 note 3} Just as much as the attitude I naturally take to human beings is part of my concept of a human being – see pp. 164–5 above.

^{page 188 note 1} See Part 1 above.

^{page 188 note 2} What Wittgenstein says about ‘grounds’ and ‘justification’ in the Investigations, I, 480Google Scholar with regard to Hume's doubt about whether past experience can be a ground for a prediction can be suitably adapted to meet Hume's query about whether a statement of fact can ever justify a judgment of value.

^{page 189 note 1} Weil, Simone, La Connaissance Surnaturelle (Gallimard, 1950).Google Scholar

^{page 189 note 2} Waiting on God, p. 68.Google Scholar

^{page 189 note 3} See pp. 182–5 above.

^{page 189 note 4} ‘Some Reflections on the Love of God’, On Science, Necessity and the Love of God, p. 154.Google Scholar

^{page 190 note 1} The Human World, 11 3 (05, 1971).Google Scholar