CJO - Abstract - Animal Belief

Cambridge Journals Online

Volume 75
Issue 04 - Oct 2000
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Animal Belief

Roger Fellows (2000).
Philosophy, Volume 75, Issue 04, October 2000 pp 587-598 http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=61497

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Philosophy (2000), 75 : 587-598 Cambridge University Press

Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2000

doi:10.1017/S0031819100000681 (About doi)

Published online by Cambridge University Press 11 Dec 2000

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Philosophy (2000), 75:4:587-598 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2000

Animal Belief

Roger Fellows

Abstract

Non language-using animals cannot have beliefs, because believing entails the ability to distinguish true from false beliefs and also the ability to distinguish changes in belief from changes in the world. For these abilities we need both the fixation of belief and counter-factual thought, for both of which language is necessary. The argument of the paper extends Davidson's argument to the same conclusion (which is found wanting). But denying beliefs to animals has no moral implications.