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A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 2009

ANKE REICHHUBER ,
EVA CAMACHO  and
TILL REQUATE
ANKE REICHHUBER
Affiliation:
Environmental, Rural and Social Development, The World Bank, United States
EVA CAMACHO
Affiliation:
Department of Economics Analysis, Autonomous University of Madrid, Cantoblanco, Madrid. Spain. Email: eva.camacho@uam.es
TILL REQUATE
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Germany
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Abstract

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 5 , October 2009 , pp. 641 - 663
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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