The Journal of Politics

Table of Contents - July 2009 - Volume 71, Issue 03  

ARTICLES

A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining International Criminal Court Negotiations

Jay Goodliffea1 and Darren Hawkinsa2

a1 Brigham Young University

a2 Brigham Young University

Abstract

The first proposal for the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1994 envisioned a weak institution. Over the subsequent four years, states surprisingly strengthened the draft to create a robust ICC with novel enforcement authority. What happened and why? We argue that during negotiations governments adopted the positions of the international partners on whom they depend for a diverse set of goods that includes trade, security, and foreign policy success in international organizations. We label this set of partners a “dependence network.” In our approach, leaders watch closely how other governments behave within their dependence network and alter their own actions accordingly. We test this theory against a variety of other explanations on a new database that codes state negotiating positions relative to four key institutional features of the ICC. We find that trade networks substantially influence state negotiating positions on the ICC even taking into account an array of other factors.

(Received December 14 2007)

(Accepted September 06 2008)

Footnotes

Jay Goodliffe is associate professor of political science, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602.

Darren Hawkins is professor of political science, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602.