Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:228-229 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09001174

Open Peer Commentary

A one-system theory that is not propositional


James E. Witnauera1, Gonzalo P. Urcelaya2 and Ralph R. Millera1

a1 Department of Psychology, State University of New York–Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000 jwitnau1@binghamton.edu rmiller@binghamton.edu http://www2.binghamton.edu/psychology/
a2 Department of Experimental Psychology and Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom. gu203@cam.ac.uk http://www.psychol.cam.ac.uk/
Article author query
witnauer je [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
urcelay gp [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
miller rr [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

We argue that the propositional and link-based approaches to human contingency learning represent different levels of analysis because propositional reasoning requires a basis, which is plausibly provided by a link-based architecture. Moreover, in their attempt to compare two general classes of models (link-based and propositional), Mitchell et al. refer to only two generic models and ignore the large variety of different models within each class.

The propositional nature of human associative learning Chris J. Mitchell, Jan De Houwer and Peter F. Lovibond School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Kensington 2052, Australia chris.mitchell@unsw.edu.au http://www.psy.unsw.edu.au/profiles/cmitchell.html; Department of Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium jan.dehouwer@ugent.be http://users.ugent.be/~jdhouwer/">; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Kensington 2052, Australia p.lovibond@unsw.edu.au http://www.psy.unsw.edu.au/profiles/plovibond.html">


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