Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Table of Contents - 2009 - Volume 32, Issue 02  

Cambridge Journals Online - CUP Full-Text Page
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2009), 32:226-227 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09001150

Open Peer Commentary

How do we get from propositions to behavior?

Daniel A. Sternberga1 and James L. McClellanda2

a1 Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 sternberg@stanford.edu
a2 Department of Psychology and the Center for Mind, Brain, and Computation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. jlm@psych.stanford.edu http://psych.stanford.edu/~jlm
Article author query
sternberg da [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]
mcclelland jl [PubMed]  [Google Scholar]

Abstract

Mitchell et al. describe many fascinating studies, and in the process, propose what they consider to be a unified framework for human learning in which effortful, controlled learning results in propositional knowledge. However, it is unclear how any of their findings privilege a propositional account, and we remain concerned that embedding all knowledge in propositional representations obscures the tight interdependence between learning from experiences and the use of the results of learning as a basis for action.

The propositional nature of human associative learning Chris J. Mitchell, Jan De Houwer and Peter F. Lovibond School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Kensington 2052, Australia chris.mitchell@unsw.edu.au http://www.psy.unsw.edu.au/profiles/cmitchell.html; Department of Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium jan.dehouwer@ugent.be http://users.ugent.be/~jdhouwer/">; School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Kensington 2052, Australia p.lovibond@unsw.edu.au http://www.psy.unsw.edu.au/profiles/plovibond.html">